Victims and Case Files > Semyon Zolotaryov

Could Zolotaryov be a saboteur?

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Jean Daniel Reuss:

--- Quote from: Manti on October 05, 2021, 11:35:00 AM ---                Reply #15
 • ... we are talking about a group of young adults who went on a ski trip.
 • Why would it be the KGB's responsibility to protect them,
 • and from whom would they even need to be protected?   
 • And the NKVD was disbanded in 1946, thirteen years before the Dyatlov incident.
--- End quote ---

Thank you for these wise questions which stimulate the examination of the various aspects of the  DPI.

•••  --->  the NKVD was disbanded in 1946, thirteen years before the Dyatlov incident.
This is perfectly correct, the NKVD was abolished in 1946 (as well as the SMERSH), but it was replaced by other institutions or state administrations roughly equivalent: NKVD-NKGB, NKGB-MGB, MGB(Ministry of State Security), MVD(Ministry of Internal Affairs)...etc.... It is complicated and I do not know the details of all these changes. (NKGB)

After the elimination of Beria in 1953, the KGB (Committee for State Security) was officially created on March 13, 1954 by Khrushchev.

Secret police (or political police)[1] are intelligence, security or police agencies that engage in covert operations against a government's political opponents and dissidents. Secret police organizations are characteristic of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. They protect the political power of a dictator or regime, and often operate outside the law to repress dissidents and weaken political opposition, frequently using violence.

During the Soviet period after Stalin, the KGB (1954-1991) was particularly prominent and active.
It was "inclined" to execute those whom it- or rather the powerful Communist Party (CPSU) - percieved as being enemies of the state.
the KGB favoured active measures (e.g. disinformation), in discrediting the USSR's enemies.
For war-time, KGB had ready sabotage operations arms caches in target countries.

•••  --->   Why would it be the KGB's responsibility to protect them ?
1) - The organization of the Soviet security and intelligence organs, which frequently changed, is complicated and I know it poorly.

At that time there were mainly, unless I am mistaken :

   a/ The military intelligence, GRU, dependent on the General Staff of the Armed Forces

   b/The police depending on the MVD, depending on the Ministry of Interior,

   c/The missions of the KGB were particularly prominent, numerous and varied.
The primary task of the KGB was to protect the regime. Its activities included tracking down spies and dissidents and supervising the media, sports and even the church. It conducted operations both inside and outside the country, but in both spheres its main task was always to protect the interests of the Kremlin leadership.
 This included the protection of personalities and also of good Soviet citizens

In practice, all these three administrations (GRU, MVD, KGB) could carry out internal security missions.
Compared to KGB officers, GRU officers, were "more direct and less politicized but also more brutal." Anecdotally, the special forces: Spetsnaz seem to be attached to the GRU and sometimes to the MVD?

Nothing prohibits the KGB from investigating, which is also one of its roles, in cases of organized crime, terrorism, thus doubling the MVD.

2) - In 1959, the maintenance of internal security was a particularly important problem because of the massive and uncontrolled release of zeks from the Gulag camps. These releases were part of Khrushchev's Thaw policy and encountered opposition from the Stalinists, supporters and followers of the hard line of the "Vojd".

The majority of those released were harmless and innocent. But the disorganization of the liberation procedures had put back into circulation genuine bandits or criminals.

3) - The hikers were certainly not notables but they represented in some ways the elite of the Soviet youth and the future of the USSR because they were called to occupy engineering functions with responsibilities that were to participate in the influence and strengthening of the country.

4) - UPI was a great engineering school which was comparable to other higher technical education institutes in Moscow or Leningrad.
In 1959, the UPI even had the advantage of being located near the research and production centers of the Urals working in innovative nuclear (and electronic?) technologies, which were particularly supported by Khrushchev himself.

•••  --->   from whom would they even need to be protected ?
1) - Indeed, a good principle of security is to always remember that the greatest danger is the one that we did not, or could not, foresee.
See also :

2) - Khrushchev while remaining fidelity to the foundations of the communism wanted to struggle against the arbitrary and criminal orders of Stalin which led to a climate of terror among all the classes of the Soviet populations.

By denouncing the crimes committed under Stalin Khrushchev had clearly specified his will to destroy Stalinism during his very long Secret Report of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 24, 1956, from which I extract below some significant lines.

------«...the cult of the person of Stalin never ceased to grow, how this cult became, at a precise moment, the source of a whole series of serious and ever more serious perversions of the principles of the Party, of the democracy of the Party, of revolutionary legality...

Anyone who opposed his conception or tried to explain his point of view and the correctness of his position was destined to be cut off from the ruling community and subsequently doomed to moral and physical annihilation.

Essentially and in fact the only evidence of guilt used, against all standards of present-day legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and as subsequent investigations proved, "confessions" were obtained through physical pressure against the accused.

Stalin demonstrated his intolerance, his brutal behavior and abused his powers. Instead of proving the correctness of his policies and mobilizing the masses, he frequently chooses the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against his real enemies, but also against individuals who had committed no crime against them. the Party and the Soviet government

Stalin allowed the Party and the NKVD to use mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and there was no longer any serious reason to employ exceptional measures of mass terror. »
The de-Stalinization led to the strong discontent of the many people who support the Stalinist methods (there are still some in Putin's Russia today)
and particularly of many Stalinist officers, former members of the NKVD, in charge of the guarding of the Gulag camps, and thus of the Ivdellag near Vizhay.

(In France, Krushchev leaves the reputation of a valorous man, who did what he could, but whose confused action was slowed down, then stopped by the Stalinists of the Politbureau who conspired to make him dismiss, on October 14, 1964, failing to be able to eliminate him physically).

3) - On several occasions the Dyatlov group had exhibited and used in an effective way the voucher.
The hikers, who benefited from a quality education, could thus appear, in the eyes of the rough Stalinists of Ivdellag, as being propagandists charged to promote the 21st congress of the CPSU (27 January - 5 February 1959).
Moreover, with the occurrence of the 21st Congress, these hardened Stalinist dignitaries feared a strengthening of the de-Stalinization, (which in fact did not happen).

In the section "Project plan for the expedition of Dyatlov group - Goals and objectives" established by the Route Commission: (sheet 200)
Propaganda for Krushchev's Thaw is indeed suggested:
  • Getting to know the nature and economy of the Northern Urals.
  • Holding lectures and carrying out conversations among the public.
  • Improving the athletic skills of hikers.
  • Study of the depth of soil freezing according to surveys and observations of residents of the Northern Urals.
------4) - It was thus conceivable, or even probable, that the Stalinist opposition, (which was particularly strong in Vizhay because of the proximity of Ivdellag), in the face of the provocation constituted by the arrival of this group which benefited from an official viaticum, manifested itself by a terrorist attack aiming at impressing the central power in Moscow.

On the one hand: In all the countries the governmental propaganda (or more simply the inflection of the information) generally tries to minimize the inland difficulties and the internal insecurity

On the other hand: In the absence of any indication of what insights the hikers might have had into the internal dissensions of the USSR during the Khushchev Thaw, it is safe to assume that the hikers appear to have been totally unaware of the small political role they played against their will.

This is what anganontaolo: so elegantly refers to in one of his replies to "Why they abandon tent, clothes and object  August 07, 2021, 04:37:35 PM    Reply #3"

The risk was very great on this mountain and essential items should be ready if ever a problem arises: clothes, flashlight, ax, knife, etc ...
Have they ever thought of attacks and getting ready to defend themselves against it? or else they believed that indeed there is no crime in paradise (socialist paradise) as Stalin said.   ---> and Krushchev also said that.

Neither the « Route Commission », nor anyone else, had told the hikers that they might encounter some hostility in these remote provincial territories.
The hikers (except perhaps Zolotaryov), constantly immersed in the safe and secure atmosphere of the Sverdlovk engineers, lived under the illusion that perfect security prevailed everywhere in the country.

The surprise of the of the 1 February attack was therefore total.

Indeed IF the hikers had been warned that the area was not perfectly secure, the hikers would have been on their guard and would have remained on the alert. So the outcome of the deadly altercation that took place on the slope of Kholat Syakhl and near the cedar might have been different, for the hikers, more numerous and younger than the attackers, were not without any advantage in hand-to-hand combat without firearms.

Based on their previous life experiences, Zolotaryov, Thibo and Kolevatov may have been more aware than the other 6 hikers of the country's internal political difficulties. This remark could explain the possible separation (Den versus fire under the cedar) that seems to have taken place at the cedar during the attack.

•••  --->    we are talking about a group of young adults who went on a ski trip.
1) - In complement to its sporting interest, the institution of category 3 for hikes was intended to show to all public opinions and to families the moral qualities of Soviet youth and indirectly the moral superiority of the communist ideology and of the Russian soul.

According to what we know about the DPI, the 9 hikers of Dyatlov's group were trained for self-supporting (autonomous) hikes, relatively acclimatized to the cold and
in full possession of their physical and mental capacities.

However, their equipment (warm clothes, sleeping bag, tent, skis and also food adapted to the cold...) was poor according to the modern criteria of 2021.

2) - By volunteering to take part in a category 3 winter hike, the young Russian sportsmen could demonstrate (Russian) particular qualities: a fondness for prolonged effort, a disregard for comfort, a team spirit, the ability to adapt to unforeseen difficulties, the mental stamina to enjoy long journeys in a hostile and austere environment......

3) - On the other hand, the society of the time encouraged this kind of initiative, since the hikes approved by the UPI Route Commission received a small financial contribution.

•••  --->  The matter of  Zolotaryov is maybe more confused.
It may seem a strange thing that the tattoos on his arms found at the autopsy had not been noticed before.
There is perhaps one remaining question:
Is the person who was part of Dyatlov's group and who appears in the photos the same person as the Soviet army soldier who fought on the Eastern Front ?

« Some researchers of the tragedy of the Dyatlov group believe that Zolotarev could have been an unofficial employee of the security agencies. And even that he went with a secret mission on that fateful expedition. » ( Varsegova )

On the contrary we can think that his career, that of an independent temperament and also of an irreproachable warrior on the Eastern front, then a little bit de-socialized afterwards, does not look out of the ordinary
Personally, and according to the TOK theory, I think it is irrelevant whether Zolotaryov was or was not a KGB agent.

On the other hand, it is likely that he would have been happy, like any good patriotic citizen, to help the authorities and therefore the KGB if some opportunity arose.


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