Post by: Teddy on September 07, 2020, 03:47:54 AM
"There was no snowstorm": New investigation conclusions on the weather the night of the Dyatlov Pass incident
This weather report is part of the prosecutor's investigation in 2019
All right belong to Komsomolskaya Pravda. Authors Nikolay Varsegov and Natalya Varsegova
In the winter of 1959, a group of nine hikers disappeared in the mountains of the Northern Urals. They were led by fifth-year student of the Ural Polytechnic Institute Igor Dyatlov. For 18 days, the group had to ski 300 kilometers in the north of the Sverdlovsk region, climbing two peaks. The hike was of the highest category of difficulty according to the 1950s classification. A month after the disappearance of the hikers, rescuers found their tent cut from inside and five frozen bodies within a radius of one and a half kilometers on the slope of a pass. The bodies of the rest were found only in May. The investigation found that some of the hikers died from the cold, but some of them had fatal injuries of unknown origin. What exactly happened to the Dyatlov group is still unknown.
In 1959, investigators closed the criminal case with a strange wording: "The cause of death of hikers was a overwhelming force, which they were unable to overcome." No one ventured to explain what kind of "overwhelming force". The first thing that comes to mind is maybe some kind of meteorological phenomenon? Like a sbowstorm? But there is practically no mention of the weather in the official documents. No requests to local hydrometeorological services, no meteorological information. In general, we doubt that the investigators were then interested in the weather on the day the hikers died.
In the criminal case, there are only a few witness statements, from which it is known that, for example, the forester Rempel from Vizhay warned Igor Dyatlov about strong winds in the mountains in winter. And witness Popov said that in early February the weather was terribly windy. But the forester's warnings can hardly be considered official confirmation, and Popov, judging by the document, communicated with the investigator on February 6, which does not fit in with the beginning of the criminal case initiated on February 26.
As it happens, no one has yet explained this discrepancy in the dates, not even the prosecutor's office. But the prosecutor's office tried to establish whether there was a severe frost and winds with the force of a hurricane at the pass on the night of 1 to 2 of February, 1959.
A microclimatic examination of the Kholat Syakhl mountain region in January-February 1959 was carried out at the Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory in St. Petersburg. The specialists used the method of calculating weather conditions based on data from several weather stations. In our case, expert Galina Pigoltsina determined a detailed microclimatic assessment of the Dyatlov pass, relying on the readings of January-February 1959 of the nearest stations Ivdel, Burmantovo, Vizhay, as well as Taganay (a high-mountain point 600 km south of Kholat Syakhl), Polyudova Kamen (western foothills of the Urals ). The expert noted that the Dyatlov pass has been studied "in meteorological terms extremely insufficiently", and information about the area is "practically absent". That is why the conclusions are circumstantial. Here they are:
It snowed continuously in the area of Mount Kholat Syakhl from January 31 to February 1. The snowfalls were accompanied by strong winds, with temperatures ranging from -10°C to -32°C. Please note that temperatures are calculated not only by hours and by hiker's locations.
| Date 1959 | Time hour | Alleged behaviour of the Dyatlov group | Temperature °C | |
| tent | cedar | |||
| 1 Feb | 1 pm | Skiers prepare to exit from the Auspiya valley to go on the pass | -14.1 | -12.4 |
| 3 pm | Go over the pass | -15.4 | -13.5 | |
| 5 pm | Start setting up the tent | -16.4 | -14.5 | |
| 7 pm | Hikers settle inside the tent | -17.9 | -16.2 | |
| 9 pm | Something or someone makes them abandon the tent | -19.1 | -17.7 | |
| 11 pm | Hikers reach the cedar | -22.5 | -21.3 | |
| 2 Feb | 1 am | What happened during these hours is unknown | -26.0 | -25.0 |
| 3 am | -28.7 | -27.8 | ||
| 5 am | According to some forensic doctors, by this time the hikers were already dead. They estimated the onset of death to be 8 hours after their last meal. | -30.6 | -29.7 | |
| 7 am | -31.7 | -30.8 | ||
The well-known forensic expert Eduard Tumanov does not agree with this conclusion.
- I do not agree with the method of calculating the time of death by examining the stomach content, the expert says. - It is based on the fact that a person ate at a certain hour and the contents gradually enter the stomach, and then descend into the intestines, and that all this happens at some intervals. But each person has his own intestinal rhythm. And in the case of Dyatlov group incident, cold and stress must be taken into account. And even the cause of death affects intestinal motility. The reaction of the intestines to agony can not be predicted and taken into account e.g. each body reacts differently.
Wind
Was there a strong wind (with force of a hurricane) on Kholat Syakhl that drove the hikers out of their tent to their demise? We know from ourselves that a strong piercing wind blows constantly on the mountain - both in winter and in summer. The microclimatic examination answers the questions how strong it was on February 1, 1959.
Galina Pigoltsina claims that on February 1 and 2, 1959, according to aerological and synoptic data, a northwest wind was blowing over the mountains. A wind shadow has formed on the eastern slope (a place where the wind speed is significantly reduced). Skiers set up their tent there.
| Date 1959 | Time hour | Wind speed (m/s) | |
| tent | cedar | ||
| 1 Feb |
1 pm
|
11.7 | 9.8 |
|
3 pm
|
10.6 | 8.9 | |
|
5 pm
|
9.8 | 8.2 | |
|
7 pm
|
9.2 | 7.7 | |
|
9 pm
|
9.0 | 7.4 | |
|
11 pm
|
9.4 | 7.6 | |
| 2 Feb |
1 am
|
10.2 | 8.2 |
|
3 am
|
11.3 | 8.8 | |
|
5 am
|
12.1 | 9.4 | |
|
7 am
|
12.4 | 9.6 | |
It turns out that the wind speed was relatively low. There was no snowstorm in the day of the Dyatlov group incident. We found an circumstantial confirmation of this in the diaries of journalist Gennadiy Grigoriev "Snowstorm in the Mountains", who was at the scene of the tragedy during the search. He wrote: "I imagined, listening to the whisper from the cedar, how Krivonischenko and Doroshenko died here. There is moss on the birch trees. Near the cedar there is a mountain ash [aka rowan] bush. Snow all around (deep). On the mountain ash are a few dry leafs and a some berries not yet pecked by the birds." Obviously, a hurricane wind would not have left any leaves or berries on the trees.
The "feels like" temperature is a measurement of how hot or cold it really feels like outside. For example, skin that is exposed to wind and cold temperatures will make a person feel that it is colder outside than it really is because heat is drawn away from the body at a faster rate. When we look at the weather on the phone, the application shows two values: minus 25, it feels like minus 30. The latter value is the wind chill index, the complex effect of temperature and wind on a person.
The wind chill index on 1 and 2 of February, 1959, at the tent and cedar:
| Date 1959 | Time hour | It feels like °C | |
| tent | cedar | ||
| 1 Feb |
1 pm
|
-26.5 | -23.4 |
|
3 pm
|
-27.7 | -24.4 | |
|
5 pm
|
-28.7 | -25.3 | |
|
7 pm
|
-30.3 | -27.2 | |
|
9 pm
|
-31.8 | -29.0 | |
|
11 pm
|
-36.5 | -33.8 | |
| 2 Feb |
1 am
|
-41.6 | -39.0 |
|
3 am
|
-45.9 | -43.1 | |
|
5 am
|
-48.9 | -46.0 | |
|
7 am
|
-50.5 | -47.6 | |
|
9 am
|
-49.7 | -46.6 | |
|
11 am
|
-44.6 | -41.5 | |
Wind chill index values:
| °C | Risk of hypothermia and frostbite on exposed skin | °F | ||
| From | To | From | To | |
| -10 | -28 | Low risk | 14 | -18.4 |
| -28 | -40 | Moderate risk within 10-30 min | -18.4 | -40 |
| -40 | -48 | High risk within 5-10 min | -40 | -54.4 |
| -48 | -55 | Very high risk within 2-5 min | -54.4 | -67 |
It turns out that at the moment when the tourists left the tent (at about 9 pm), the wind chill index both at the level of the tent -31.8°C (-25.2°F) and at the level of the cedar -29°C (-20.2°F) corresponded to the moderate risk of hypothermia and frostbite... By the time three hikers decided to scale the slope back to the tent, at about 3~5 am, the wind chill index at the cedar was already -43~-46°C (-45.6~-50.8°F).
Snow
The key point of the microclimatic examination is the increased thickness of the snow cover to 250 cm, which, according to Pigoltsina, formed 50 m above the tent. It was this large mass of snow that allegedly descended onto the tent under the influence of the wind and thaw. It is known that at the end of January the weather in those parts was warm for the winter. But on February 1, the temperature began to drop lower and lower. This, according to some researchers, provoked the formation of the snow slab.
A participant in the search for the Dyatlov group, Vladislav Karelin, analyzed the expert's calculations and did not agree with them.
- I was at the pass from February 27 to March 9, 1959, - Vladislav Georgievich recalls. - And I didn't see any signs of an avalanche. In addition, the tent was not on the eastern slope of Kholat Syakhl, but on the slope of the northeastern spur of this mountain range. The expert calculated the distribution of the height of the snow cover over the tent, using the pattern she obtained on the slopes of the Aibga ridge in the Caucasus. But the conditions of the Caucasian relief are fundamentally different from the altitude characteristics of the Ural Mountains. The slopes and peaks in the Caucasus are steep and rocky, with a well pronounced prominence, and in the Urals there are smooth outlines of peaks with a small difference in heights on the slopes. These differences cast doubt on the results of the expert's calculations. In addition, my observations made during the search clearly contradict the calculated data of the expert. According to Galina Pigoltsina, the depth of the snow near the tent was 150 cm. But during my searches in February-March 1959, I repeatedly stuck a metal probe into the snow, which went deep near the tent in no way more than 80-100 cm. According to the expert's calculations, the depth of the snow on the northeastern spur of Mount Kholat Syakhl in 1959 was 140 cm. But I, together with the head of search operation Evgeniy Maslennikov, climbed the northeastern spur. And there I saw stones, slightly powdered with snow. Therefore, I have great doubts about the calculations and conclusions made by the expert.
"The avalanche could have happened with a high degree of probability," the expert concluded. But it is obvious that the possibility of an avalanche is not evidence of its actual occurence. In addition, the expert did not give any real and specific signs of an avalanche. Therefore, it is not yet possible to speak of the avalanche version as the only possible cause of the tragedy.
Post by: Nigel Evans on September 07, 2020, 05:15:24 AM
How else if not very strong winds blowing snow/ice particles?
Post by: Teddy on September 07, 2020, 05:31:20 AM
The branches of the young firs at the treeline were stripped of bark on the side facing uphill?
How else if not very strong winds blowing snow/ice particles?
Who says when were "the branches of the young firs at the treeline stripped of bark"?
This could have happened any time prior to the fateful night.
Post by: Nigel Evans on September 07, 2020, 06:43:37 AM
Agreed the bark only indicates the winds potential in general, not of that night. For this we need a local eye witness. The best i know of is Pashin - https://dyatlovpass.com/case-files-49-50?rbid=17743The branches of the young firs at the treeline were stripped of bark on the side facing uphill?
How else if not very strong winds blowing snow/ice particles?
Who says when were "the branches of the young firs at the treeline stripped of bark"?
This could have happened any time prior to the fateful night.
"Around the time when hikers were killed even in the village of Vizhay was a strong wind and storm, from which the children were falling down". So if the winds were strong enough in Vizhay to blow children over, how strong on that ridge?
Post by: Teddy on September 07, 2020, 09:19:06 AM
"Around the time when hikers were killed even in the village of Vizhay was a strong wind and storm, from which the children were falling down".
So if the winds were strong enough in Vizhay to blow children over, how strong on that ridge?
We don't have to guess anymore. The new investigation is telling you exactly how strong the winds were on the night of the events. We can not come up with anything better. Prosecutor's office spent the time and resources to finalize this matter.
Post by: Nigel Evans on September 07, 2020, 09:51:57 AM
We don't have to guess anymore. The new investigation is telling you exactly how strong the winds were on the night of the events. We can not come up with anything better. Prosecutor's office spent the time and resources to finalize this matter.The expert noted that the Dyatlov pass has been studied "in meteorological terms extremely insufficiently", and information about the area is "practically absent". That is why the conclusions are circumstantial.
That doesn't sound very "finalised" to me....
There is nothing conclusive here imo. On the other side of the argument we have eye witness accounts of storm conditions in the relevant period, photographs that clearly show whiteout conditions in strong winds. Igor's last diary entry alludes to storm conditions - "It is hard to imagine such a comfort somewhere on the ridge, with a piercing howl of the wind".
Mountains and valleys create wind tunnels that can substantially accelerate modest airflows. Many of the reports from the rescue party in late Feb stress the strength and constancy of the wind.
Including weather reports for 600km to the south of Kholat underlines how flaky this work is. Nothing final...
Post by: Teddy on September 07, 2020, 09:58:23 AM
In general, you are right that it is still all very uncertain. Unfortunately, it will probably remain arguable.
Post by: Nigel Evans on September 07, 2020, 11:40:42 AM
Post by: sarapuk on September 08, 2020, 02:14:15 PM
I would have thought that correlating the reports of winds from the rescue party with meteorological data at the same time would allow reasonable extrapolation backwards.
It will still be little more than a guess. Lots of guessing in this Dyatlov mystery.
Post by: cennetkusu on September 09, 2020, 12:41:06 AM
Post by: PJ on September 09, 2020, 01:15:35 PM
Generally we not need any weather analyzes to ruled out that there was strong wind. The tent will be destroyed and blown out within minutes after they abandon it, not possible that it will survive any wind stronger than 80km/h.
From other side this analyzes shows that they not have much chances to survive outside the tent, windchill -45C, no proper clothes. The reason that they left the tent must be very strong...
As well, looks like that the wind got a bit stronger during the night so it could be why they abandon the fire at the cedar and try to hide in the ravine.
at 3am the wind at the cedar was around 9m/s what make windchill about -43C, if they shelter from wind in the ravine the windchill will be just -30C, for sure hiding from wind was much better option than making fire.
And about the analyzes. I think it is very accurate, today the weather modeling based on historical data is very advanced and precises so same as it is used for forecasting weather for next week it could be used to create weather forests for the past as well.
Post by: Nigel Evans on September 12, 2020, 03:21:29 AM
Post by: Monty on September 12, 2020, 01:25:02 PM
Post by: Investigator on September 12, 2020, 06:53:53 PM
Post by: sarapuk on September 14, 2020, 01:27:54 PM
The weather certainly must have been dangerous regardless of whether there was a storm, but the key question is, how did they (or at least Igor) perceive things (my sense is that they/Igor thought it would be reasonable to do what they did to try and survive the night, and apprently Russian soldiers did survive this way during WW II)? We know they left the tent and placed snow on it, then placed one of the two flashlights on that mound of snow (my guess being to prevent the wind from blowing the tent or its contents down the mountain, so they didn't need both flashlights (if there had been a storm, they would want to take both flashlights). We know they proceeded down the mountain in an orderly way (nobody got blown off their feet). We know they were able to do quite a bit of work, digging out the den, ripping a lot of branches off the tree (which one would need as a "bed" to prevent hypothermia if one just sat on snow/ice), and starting a fire that was apparently robust and lasted between around 1 and 2 hours. And they took clothing from the two Yuris and put those items on. I don't think this would be possible if there was any kind of significant storm.
We assume that they left the Tent sometime after setting it up and presumably having got some sleep first. We dont know if they put snow on the Tent.
Post by: Beluga1303 on October 17, 2020, 03:05:38 AM
If there was a westerly wind, as Igor wrote in his diary, that explains the cuts in the tent on the east side. ( I'm not sure if it was cut on the east side. I may have overlooked or skipped a note). While the group slept in the tent, the snow gradually pushed in the tent on the west side. The main exit may already have been blocked by the snowdrifts. The only option left was to leave the tent as quickly as possible.
And note the entry of Igors diary:
30. January 1959
The wind is strong, south-west, snow begins to fall, heavy clouds, drop in temperature....
31 January 1959
Today the weather is a bit worse wind (west), snow (probably from the pines) because the sky is perfectly clear.
And sorry, in this case I believe more in Igor's diary as in the prosecutor's investigation in 2019
But that's like everything, just pure theory.
Post by: Nigel Evans on October 17, 2020, 08:39:28 AM
The weather certainly must have been dangerous regardless of whether there was a storm, but the key question is, how did they (or at least Igor) perceive things (my sense is that they/Igor thought it would be reasonable to do what they did to try and survive the night, and apprently Russian soldiers did survive this way during WW II)? We know they left the tent and placed snow on it, then placed one of the two flashlights on that mound of snow (my guess being to prevent the wind from blowing the tent or its contents down the mountain, so they didn't need both flashlights (if there had been a storm, they would want to take both flashlights). We know they proceeded down the mountain in an orderly way (nobody got blown off their feet). We know they were able to do quite a bit of work, digging out the den, ripping a lot of branches off the tree (which one would need as a "bed" to prevent hypothermia if one just sat on snow/ice), and starting a fire that was apparently robust and lasted between around 1 and 2 hours. And they took clothing from the two Yuris and put those items on. I don't think this would be possible if there was any kind of significant storm.
We assume that they left the Tent sometime after setting it up and presumably having got some sleep first. We dont know if they put snow on the Tent.
Imo an explanation for the flashlight being outside on top of 10cm of snow is that it was for nocturnal toilet trips. There were signs of urination so it fits that someone used it and placed it there after some build up of snow.
Post by: Marchesk on October 18, 2020, 09:56:55 PM
Agreed the bark only indicates the winds potential in general, not of that night. For this we need a local eye witness. The best i know of is Pashin - https://dyatlovpass.com/case-files-49-50?rbid=17743
"Around the time when hikers were killed even in the village of Vizhay was a strong wind and storm, from which the children were falling down". So if the winds were strong enough in Vizhay to blow children over, how strong on that ridge?
"Around that time" is not necessarily the same as that night, and someone recalling strong winds is not the same as an actual weather report, which they apparently had for Vizhay. This is similar to hikers and locals nearby seeing lights in the sky around that time, which is not an exact date, since it doesn't matter if those lights were seen a day before or two days after.
Post by: eurocentric on October 24, 2020, 11:55:37 AM
Using the meterological data, flawed as it may be, this implies it would be -9.1 inside that tent if it was -19.1 outside of it at 9pm. You then have to take into consideration the wind chill, because even if they are inside, the tent is in a poor state of repair, with one hole large enough to need blocking with a coat, so cold air will be entering the air space in such an exposed position.
They would arrive near the summit a lot earlier than the data suggests, which states they started setting up the tent at 5pm, because it was sunset at 4:29pm and there's 2 photo's showing them digging the trench in daylight.
That means they would make their ascent and attempt to speed dig a trench and erect a tent by nightfall, possibly arriving there around 3 to 3:30pm, exposed to an estimated wind chill of -28 for several hours, and then spent a stimulating evening sat inside this unheated WW2-era tent. A number of them stripped off outer clothing, which would be to air themselves off from the sweat of their exertions, because without being dry at skin level they could not hope to retain body heat using the insulating air gaps of multiple layers of cotton clothing. And all this without lighting their stove, which may or may not have remained unpacked because they only had enough fuel to last a certain number of hours so were putting that off until 10 or 11pm (they typically rose around 10am).
Hypothermia affects people both physically and mentally. As their core temperature drops they cannot perform basic tasks, they cannot reliably count back from 10, they suffer from amnesia, and they can hallucinate (a potential alternative explanation, if you prefer, for cutting their way out the tent, if they started 'seeing' things, including the yeti they wrote about). They can become lethargic and depressed, and of course, at extremes, they can take off their clothing and make places to hide - paradoxical undressing and terminal burrowing.
The behaviour of the hikers on the ridge matches a lot of what can happen, and all the conditions were perfect for it. They leave without what they need (amnesia), their behaviour is bizarre, they need to be led like schoolchildren down the pass, assembling near the tent, and some tracks deviated during the descent before rejoining the group - hypothermics cannot walk in a straight line, acting as if drunk.
A few years ago the UK had a rare cold snap, though nothing by Russian, Canadian or Scandi standards, at -15. I cycled to a supermarket in the early evening, a 2-mile round trip, perhaps 15 minutes on the road, and I was properly dressed. But when I got back home I immediately thought there was an intruder, "there's someone in the house!", because he had clearly turned the heating on full blast, then I reminded myself I didn't have any central heating, and it was 7 degrees inside.
That short journey, with a 'wind' of 12mph when riding a bike, had exposed me, my face mainly, to a wind chill of -24 and for only 15 minutes, yet it made my home feel like it was 25 degrees+ indoors because of how rapidly it had chilled my core temperature.
https://www.calculator.net/wind-chill-calculator.html
(https://i.ibb.co/bbQz8XY/wind-chill.png) (https://ibb.co/rdF41Hq)
Post by: sarapuk on October 25, 2020, 04:47:32 PM
The temperature differential between the inside and outside of an unheated tent is said to be around 10 degrees for canvas (hemp, and later cotton) and 15+ for modern fabrics, according to camping forums I referenced.
Using the meterological data, flawed as it may be, this implies it would be -9.1 inside that tent if it was -19.1 outside of it at 9pm. You then have to take into consideration the wind chill, because even if they are inside, the tent is in a poor state of repair, with one hole large enough to need blocking with a coat, so cold air will be entering the air space in such an exposed position.
They would arrive near the summit a lot earlier than the data suggests, which states they started setting up the tent at 5pm, because it was sunset at 4:29pm and there's 2 photo's showing them digging the trench in daylight.
However lets not forget the acclimatisation factor. And as you are probably aware, people who live in cold climates are better equipped to deal with more extreme cold. So the Dyatlov Group were well equipped, mentality and physically and clothing wise. But the Tent should not have been pitched in such an exposed position. It all kicks off at the Tent. But why would they want to pitch the Tent in such a position. It would have made more sense to pitch the Tent near the Treeline.
That means they would make their ascent and attempt to speed dig a trench and erect a tent by nightfall, possibly arriving there around 3 to 3:30pm, exposed to an estimated wind chill of -28 for several hours, and then spent a stimulating evening sat inside this unheated WW2-era tent. A number of them stripped off outer clothing, which would be to air themselves off from the sweat of their exertions, because without being dry at skin level they could not hope to retain body heat using the insulating air gaps of multiple layers of cotton clothing. And all this without lighting their stove, which may or may not have remained unpacked because they only had enough fuel to last a certain number of hours so were putting that off until 10 or 11pm (they typically rose around 10am).
Hypothermia affects people both physically and mentally. As their core temperature drops they cannot perform basic tasks, they cannot reliably count back from 10, they suffer from amnesia, and they can hallucinate (a potential alternative explanation, if you prefer, for cutting their way out the tent, if they started 'seeing' things, including the yeti they wrote about). They can become lethargic and depressed, and of course, at extremes, they can take off their clothing and make places to hide - paradoxical undressing and terminal burrowing.
The behaviour of the hikers on the ridge matches a lot of what can happen, and all the conditions were perfect for it. They leave without what they need (amnesia), their behaviour is bizarre, they need to be led like schoolchildren down the pass, assembling near the tent, and some tracks deviated during the descent before rejoining the group - hypothermics cannot walk in a straight line, acting as if drunk.
A few years ago the UK had a rare cold snap, though nothing by Russian, Canadian or Scandi standards, at -15. I cycled to a supermarket in the early evening, a 2-mile round trip, perhaps 15 minutes on the road, and I was properly dressed. But when I got back home I immediately thought there was an intruder, "there's someone in the house!", because he had clearly turned the heating on full blast, then I reminded myself I didn't have any central heating, and it was 7 degrees inside.
That short journey, with a 'wind' of 12mph when riding a bike, had exposed me, my face mainly, to a wind chill of -24 and for only 15 minutes, yet it made my home feel like it was 25 degrees+ indoors because of how rapidly it had chilled my core temperature.
https://www.calculator.net/wind-chill-calculator.html
(https://i.ibb.co/bbQz8XY/wind-chill.png) (https://ibb.co/rdF41Hq)
Post by: Per Inge Oestmoen on September 02, 2021, 03:19:39 PM
In 1959, investigators closed the criminal case with a strange wording: "The cause of death of hikers was a overwhelming force, which they were unable to overcome." No one ventured to explain what kind of "overwhelming force".
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That sounds like aesopean language.
Did these investigators intend to say something they could under no circumstances state openly? Something that might cause some "natural deaths" or "accidents" if it was divulged?
In the Soviet Union, there was an overwhelming and ubiquitous force. It was the most elite, competent, skilled and merciless intelligence and security agency in all of human history - Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti.
The Soviet authorities evidently knew of the death of the nine on February 6th, twenty days before the first bodies were found and many days before anyone in Sverdlovsk or Ivdel had any reason to infer that something had happened to the students. This we know from a document dated from February sixth, later explained away by the not very credible assertion that is was an error.
On February 6, preparations for an investigation were put down in writing if the date was indeed correct. We have no reason to doubt that it was. To prepare for an investigation normally takes some days. That means that they would have known about the death of the students some days before the sixth of February.
- The students were killed on the night of February 2.
There was no snowstorm, but the government has claimed that it was: https://dyatlovpass.com/investigation-materials-2?rbid=18461
Lastly, the criminal investigation was cut short: https://dyatlovpass.com/investigation-materials-3
The cover-up is so obvious that no thinking person should fail to draw the more than likely conclusion: The students became witnesses to something they were not supposed to know, and had to pay with their lives for that. Because what they knew made them a potential threat to state security.
Post by: Jean Daniel Reuss on September 03, 2021, 03:20:57 PM
Dear Per Inge Oestmoen
I agree with much of your post Reply #20
But not on the involvement of the KGB.
Besides, IMHO there was nothing important to observe on the slope of Kholat Syakhl.
I was influenced by the arguments of Aleks Kandr
http://mystery12home.ru/t-ub-gr-dyatlova
The DPI is one consequence of the purging of the irrecoverable stalinists officers of the NKVD (in charge of the guarding of the Gulag camps) by the KGB during the Khrushchev Thaw (1953-1964).
The DPI was a warning message from the Stalinist opposition intended for the Kremlin, so there was no need to stage a false appearance at the scene (ie Kholat Syakhl) of the massacre.
And rather an idea from Eduard Tumanov:
The systematic extermination of the 9 hikers was carried out without firearm but with blunt objects (big stick) and a small knife.
Vladimir Askenadzi had said at the end of this article:
https://dyatlovpass.com/askinadzi?filter_page=3&rbid=18461
«...I don’t know who or why they were murdered. But this seems to me the only explanation of their death.»
Me too, "I thought a lot about this" (sic Askenadzi) and I slowly came to a criminological theory (more rigorously an explanatory hypothesis) which is able to answer easily to :
This theory was naturally formed by gathering the individual contributions of 3 main authors who are : Eduard Tumanov, Per Inge Oestmoen, Aleks Kandr.
Therefore, in recognition and in tribute to its 3 main pillars or founding fathers, I have chosen the name of TOK theory.
I beg you to grant me the favor of using your name in this way.
(As I do not know how to contact Eduard Tumanov and Aleks Kandr, I did not ask them ! ).
P.S.
What do you think of the arguments of Lupos (Günter Wolf) in favour of a snowstorm ?
https://forum.dyatlovpass.com/index.php?topic=542.msg11568#msg11568
Lupos' full article :
https://www.magentacloud.de/lnk/TvM4ltL6
But, anyway, my point of view is, Snowstorm ---> Wind : 35 m/s and Temperature -50 °C (for example),
or NO Snowstorm ---> Wind : 3 m/s and Temperature : -5 °C (for example).
The nine hikers had to be exterminated and were exterminated by the attackers (probably only 3), trained (in hand-to-hand night combat) and above all determined (to leave no survivors).
Post by: windchil on October 06, 2024, 01:23:57 AM
https://linepoetry.com/online-tools/wind-chill-calculator/
Post by: Per Inge Oestmoen on October 23, 2024, 06:47:36 AM
Dear Per Inge Oestmoen
I agree with much of your post Reply #20
But not on the involvement of the KGB.
Besides, IMHO there was nothing important to observe on the slope of Kholat Syakhl.
[...]This does not change the result :
The nine hikers had to be exterminated and were exterminated by the attackers (probably only 3), trained (in hand-to-hand night combat) and above all determined (to leave no survivors).
Dear Daniel Reuss:
I have some comments to the above.
As far as we know, there was nothing important or related to a threat to state security on the slope of Kholat Syakhl. That is true.
However, the fact that the attack took place at Kholat Syakhl does not at all mean that the objects or actions that must be concealed and kept secret at all cost were at Kholat Syakhl.
On the contrary, it is very possible that Kholat Syakhl was chosen by the killers when the Dyatlov group camped and rested there before they planned to continue. If this is correct, Kholat Syakhl was simply the best place to accomplish the mission. The actual observation of the state secret then took place elsewhere, before they reached the camp site.
So, to the killers. We cannot know their identity with absolute certainty, but we do have some clues.
The killers, or rather the people who orchestrated the killings, were aware that they had to silence the Mansi. The merciless skill with which that was done, by first pretending that the Mansi were suspect and then letting them off the hook, was a stern message to them - if they ever divulged that they were aware of the brutal killing of the nine students they would be charged with the murder and persecuted accordingly. It worked as we know. Such methods, showing great skill, intelligence and lack of mercy, is a hallmark of the KGB.
The obvious careful planning of the operation, with the masterful orchestration and execution cleverly designed to make it look like an accident, strongly suggests that the Dyatlov pass tragedy was a killing operation performed by that ubiquitous and extraordinarily skilled guardian of Soviet state security, the KGB.