Well there does appear to be missing evidence and the way that the search was conducted leaves a lot to be desired. Along with the Autopsies that appear to fall short of thorough. Imagine being in a Court of Law and having to decide what happened given this inadequate case material. Impossible I would say.
• Researches for the reconstitution of the DPI are now clearly historical researches that should not be constrained by any legal considerations.
• Indeed, scientific and historical research calls upon all the resources of human reason which are often incompatible with particular and sometimes even tendentious legislation.
• If you want to find one or more plausible explanations to the DPI, you should not imagine yourself in a court of law, nor should you be concerned about the legality of the evidence or clues.
It is not credible that the traumas and deaths were due to natural causes. We should consider all the injuries as described in the autopsy reports available on this site.
As for the infrasound theory: The infrasound theory is just a hair less fantastic than the Yeti and aliens theories. Infrasound definitely disturb humans, but we are talking about nine resourceful human beings who leave their tent during the winter night with no proper clothing.
There is absolutely no scientific reason or empirical support to the theory that it happened in this case.
As Per Inge Oestmoen
, I think it is extremely unlikely that the DPI could have been caused by infrasounds
Dyatlov's group was a homogeneous and coherent group of 9 sportsmen and women trained in winter conditions, in perfect physical and mental conditions.
The hikers only encountered bad weather that was normally predictable and they were not tired having made (wisely) short stages.
In a word, the group's margin of safety was huge.
One factor that seems not to have been emphasized is that, living in Siberia in the 1940s and 1960s, hikers were acclimatized to the cold. Also for hiking the food provided seems to have been abundant.
That is to say, to keep to an order of magnitude estimate, I can assume that each had a digestive system capable of assimilating a food ration of 6,200 kilocalories per day.
So each hiker had an average power (thermal and mechanical) of 300 watts
, (and not 100 watts as in the case of a city dweller in 2020).
At night, in the small tent where they were huddled together
, there was the equivalent of a 9×300 = 2700 watts radiant heater.
As a result, even without using the stove
, the temperature inside the tent was significantly higher than outside.
Little by little, under the influence of Eduard Tumanov
and Per Inge Oestmoen
...and others, I am moving towards solutions involving the action of attackers. These are solutions that have the tremendous advantage of being able to explain all the findings currently available.
Thus, for example, it was the attackers who obviously cut the tent canvas on the morning of February 2, 1959, before quietly leaving for Vizhay or Settlement 41.
The DPI fits easily and naturally into the history of the Khrushchev thaw period (1953-1964).
The DPI is typically an ordinary attack of a terrorist nature, resulting from the dismantling of the Gulag wanted by Khrushchev, one consequence of which was the purging of Stalinist NKVD(=MVD + MGB after 1946) personnel by KGB agents.
Death of Stalin: 5 March 1953.
Creation of the KGB: 13 March 1953.
Arrest of Beria, head of the NKVD: 26 June 1953.
Acceleration of destalinisation by the secret speech, 25 February 1956, to the 20th CPSU (Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).
Death sentence on Boris Rodos: 26 February 1956
21st CPSU: 27th January to 5th February 1959
Dyatlov's group truck journey from Vizhay (13:10) to settlement 41 (16:30): 26 January 1959
A terrorist attack is a strategy in civil psychological warfare that had been frequently used in Russia as early as the 19th century; for example, the attacks from Narodnaya Volya that caused the death of Alexander II on 1 March 1881.
The terrorist attack is generally characterised by :
Surprise and unpredictability
Its effectiveness is due to the contrast between the smallness of the necessary means and the importance of the consequences, which are, however, often unexpected and sometimes even counterproductive. (cf. heterotelistic activity).
It is necessary to stress that a terrorist attack can either be prepared for a long time by a powerful organisation or, on the contrary, be spontaneously improvised by a single determined individual.
It would take a specialised historical study to know to what extent the DPI attack could have contributed to the fall of Khrushchev on 13 October 1964, to whom Brezhnev and his cronies blamed the disastrous consequences of the dismantling of Gulag carried out without sufficient precautions. The DPI is a small episode in the struggle of the NKVD Stalinists against the thaw of Khrushchev.
The message that was thus sent to the Kremlin was: beware, do not tackle us, because we are ready to do absolutely everything to defend ourselves and preserve our privileges.
Part 3 Aleks Kandr
proposes a complete reconstruction of the DPI which I believe is probable and from which I have drawn a great deal of inspiration.
It is not prisoners (zeks) who escaped from the Ivdellag camps, nor ex-zeks, who are suspected, but on the contrary guards (or ex-guards) of the Gulag camps in the Vizhay region.
They were therefore civil servants
, which explains the cover-up of the thruth both by Khrushchev's government and also by Putin's present government.
An NKVD commanding officer, frightened by the consequences of the 20 th and 21 th CPSU
, had hired 3 Gulag camp guards specialised in the pursuit and destruction of the zeks who had escaped from the camps.
See in Russian (I use Yandex translate) :http://mystery12home.ru/t-ub-gr-dyatlovahttp://mystery12home.ru/t-ub-gr-dyatlova-2http://mystery12home.ru/t-ub-gr-dyatlova-3 https://taina.li/forum/index.php?topic=1002.0 https://taina.li/forum/index.php?topic=12235.0 https://taina.li/forum/index.php?topic=14852.0
Part 4 WHY : Examples of moral depravity among some Gulag camp guards.
Mistreatment and torture (encouraged by Joseph Stalin himself) perpetrated by some guards in the Gulag camps.
Examples reported and drawn by Danzig Baldaev (1925-2005).
The drawings that Baldaev made when he was an official of the Soviet penitentiary administration (NKVD), give for the first time the opportunity to have a picture of the ordinary functioning of the Soviet camps, precisely in their most terrible and most violent aspects.
...obviously there was some persent of sadists among NKVD personnel
( law enforcement, army and service in penetenciary system attract more % of sadists then ordinary proffessions as it is proved by psychologists) .........
Danzig Baldaev was a camp gard (NKVD officer) of the Gulag. Denounced to the KGB, he was surprisingly allowed to continue to publish his drawings.
Part 5 WHO : An example of a client (commander) that might look like the initiator of the DPI.
The commander ( mastermind, client..) was a Stalinist officer of the NKVD whose situation had some similarities with that of Boris Rodos (1905-1955).
Boris Rodos built an extraordinary career as a torturer and executioner in Soviet dictator Josef Stalin's dreaded secret police, the NKVD.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boris_Rodoshttps://russian7.ru/post/boris-rodos-chto-stalo-s-samym-zhestokim/https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-rodos-stalinist-executioner-son-nkvd-stalin/28249918.html
NKVD torturer and executioner Boris Rodos was sentenced to death one day after being denounced by Nikita Khruschev in his secret de-Stalinization speech of 1956.
Rodos was arrested in October 1953, sentenced to death on February 26, 1956, and was executed on 20 April 1956.
Part 6 HOW : Some salient aspects of the "Altercation on the pass".
The hikers had (too) talked to Vizhay and Settlement 41 and the future attackers knew approximately where the hikers were going.
North-2 was quickly reachable by truck or sled and could serve as a shelter for an intermediate stage from which the attackers could rush.
The track left by the hickers in the snow is easy to follow and starting from North-2, it was possible to reach the tent in less than a day's skiing.
There was an attack by a trinome of Gulag camp guards who were specialised in the hunting down and killing of fugitive zeks and who were accustomed to some impressive mutilations of corpses.
The precipitous escape from the tent without holding the axes and the ice axe can result :
a) Either a tear gas grenade introduced by surprise inside the tent.
b) Or more likely a classic war trick of which I gave an example in an answer to WAB
==> Theories Discussion > General Discussion > Question List => September 22, 2020, 09:43:24 AM, Reply #21https://forum.dyatlovpass.com/index.php?topic=717.msg10826#msg10826
The trinome of mercenaries attackers had no firearms, which explains why it took them several hours to defeat the 9 hikers.
In a night hand-to-hand combat a great advantage of using a blunt object wrapped in rags is that it makes it possible to dicretly and silently, or almost silently, stun any victim who strays a little from the group.
At the level of the cedar it is possible that the most politically aware (Thibo, Kolevatov, Zolotatariov) preferred to hide in the Den protecting Dubinina,
while the remaining (3?, 4?, 5?) others opted to light a fire as a priority.
The rib fractures can be explained by funny trampoline demonstrations on the elastic thoracic cages of the agonizing people ;
( 80 kg falling from 3 meters ==> 2400 joules