Route to Otorten

[Lampe7]

First I thought, that the group walked the wrong way on the 01.02.1959. It was nearly pointed out as a fact within the book I have.

But in reference to the newer map (attached and found in the forum), the route to Otorten over the top of the hills, is marked as a possible way.
And it was also in the past used from the mansi.
So, yes, they didn't walked a long way on the 01.02.1959.
But the route seems not to be wrong.

Or are there facts that underline, that they where in the wrong route? What is your status on this point.

[GlennM]

When I read the case files. I get the interpretation  that the group wished to do the trip as economically as possible. Certain things interfered with that plan. I recall they wanted to ascend by skis the frozen Auspya tributary, but it was not solid, so they had to make their way along the embankment. They had to do a relay snow plowing to make progress. There was a suggestion that the group wanted to cross the saddle between 1079 and 880 in order to get to the valley of the Lovza. For some reason they didn't do that and instead crossed over  much higher above the tree line on the Auspya. They cached supplies and made an aborted effort to take the ridge route to Ortoten. Their second and final attempt failed, as we all understand. The ridge route to Ortoten had the advantage of less obstruction in trees, but the ground itself when exposed would be hard on skis and valenkis.

At the heart of it all was the desire to do things their way in spite of warnings in Fizhay and the weather. They were on a shoestring budget, they were using old and borrowed gear, they had a certain degree of sexual tension, they promised to swear off smokes and to some degree alcohol during the trek. Their route was ambitious.

[Lampe7]

Hi Glenn,

With the actual information that I have, I follow the same direction.

It might be that the group's plan on January 31, 1959, was to end the day inside the forest. If so, they would have headed directly north through the Auspiya valley rather than moving toward the 1,079-meter slope. This seems consistent with Dyatlov's diary entry, where he describes reaching the tree line and then descending south back into the Auspiya valley to spend the night.
However, it appears that they changed their strategy on February 1, 1959.

By that point they had effectively lost a day of progress. More importantly, they changed their logistical planning. On January 31 they chose to return to the forest without establishing a cache. On February 1 they created a supply cache before continuing. This was the opposite of what they had done the day before.

The decision was economically rational and solved several problems at once. First, it reduced the weight of their packs, making the ascent much easier and addressing difficulties that had become obvious on January 31.
Second, it opened a new strategic option: travelling above the tree line toward Otorten with less effort and potentially saving time.

If this interpretation is correct, then the route on February 1 was not simply a continuation of the previous day's track. The group would have been consciously implementing a different plan. Instead of following the track they had made on January 31, they would have created a new route adapted to their revised strategy.

In that sense, every member of the group would have been aware that they were doing something different from the day before, because of leaving there foot step path from yesterday.

[GlennM]

In some sense of the word, the strategy could be understood as them making a dash for Ortoten to make up for lost time and fatigue from their uphill climb. I feel they made scant progress on their last camping day because of weather. This same weather plus deeper snow would have made camping in the next valley punishing. The ridge route had much in its favor, though exposure and an uneven ground were obstacles to overcome.  Personally, I would think that if they knew there were going to get stalled out, I would opt to pitch my tent to the lee side of boot rock.