Route to Otorten

[Lampe7]

First I thought, that the group walked the wrong way on the 01.02.1959. It was nearly pointed out as a fact within the book I have.

But in reference to the newer map (attached and found in the forum), the route to Otorten over the top of the hills, is marked as a possible way.
And it was also in the past used from the mansi.
So, yes, they didn't walked a long way on the 01.02.1959.
But the route seems not to be wrong.

Or are there facts that underline, that they where in the wrong route? What is your status on this point.

[GlennM]

When I read the case files. I get the interpretation  that the group wished to do the trip as economically as possible. Certain things interfered with that plan. I recall they wanted to ascend by skis the frozen Auspya tributary, but it was not solid, so they had to make their way along the embankment. They had to do a relay snow plowing to make progress. There was a suggestion that the group wanted to cross the saddle between 1079 and 880 in order to get to the valley of the Lovza. For some reason they didn't do that and instead crossed over  much higher above the tree line on the Auspya. They cached supplies and made an aborted effort to take the ridge route to Ortoten. Their second and final attempt failed, as we all understand. The ridge route to Ortoten had the advantage of less obstruction in trees, but the ground itself when exposed would be hard on skis and valenkis.

At the heart of it all was the desire to do things their way in spite of warnings in Fizhay and the weather. They were on a shoestring budget, they were using old and borrowed gear, they had a certain degree of sexual tension, they promised to swear off smokes and to some degree alcohol during the trek. Their route was ambitious.

[Lampe7]

Hi Glenn,

With the actual information that I have, I follow the same direction.

It might be that the group's plan on January 31, 1959, was to end the day inside the forest. If so, they would have headed directly north through the Auspiya valley rather than moving toward the 1,079-meter slope. This seems consistent with Dyatlov's diary entry, where he describes reaching the tree line and then descending south back into the Auspiya valley to spend the night.
However, it appears that they changed their strategy on February 1, 1959.

By that point they had effectively lost a day of progress. More importantly, they changed their logistical planning. On January 31 they chose to return to the forest without establishing a cache. On February 1 they created a supply cache before continuing. This was the opposite of what they had done the day before.

The decision was economically rational and solved several problems at once. First, it reduced the weight of their packs, making the ascent much easier and addressing difficulties that had become obvious on January 31.
Second, it opened a new strategic option: travelling above the tree line toward Otorten with less effort and potentially saving time.

If this interpretation is correct, then the route on February 1 was not simply a continuation of the previous day's track. The group would have been consciously implementing a different plan. Instead of following the track they had made on January 31, they would have created a new route adapted to their revised strategy.

In that sense, every member of the group would have been aware that they were doing something different from the day before, because of leaving there foot step path from yesterday.

[GlennM]

In some sense of the word, the strategy could be understood as them making a dash for Ortoten to make up for lost time and fatigue from their uphill climb. I feel they made scant progress on their last camping day because of weather. This same weather plus deeper snow would have made camping in the next valley punishing. The ridge route had much in its favor, though exposure and an uneven ground were obstacles to overcome.  Personally, I would think that if they knew there were going to get stalled out, I would opt to pitch my tent to the lee side of boot rock.

[Lampe7]

I agree with you. Again :)

To summarize the pro's to walk this way:
- Less deep snow than in the forest
- Easier and faster travel
- No trees to navigate around
- Simple navigation by following the ridge
- Partial shelter provided by the slope

One questions to your personal point, you think, they put the place on the lee side or not?
I'm not sure, if I understood correct.

The wind came from the west on the day before, as Djatlow wrote. So, if the direction didn't changed, they would be on the lee side, or?

[GlennM]

I was thinking the leeward side of Boot Rock would be the best place to pitch their the tent if they had chosen to do so.

I think their last camp was pitched because weather would not facilitate any more progress. Their camp failed because conditions worsened.

[sarapuk]

First I thought, that the group walked the wrong way on the 01.02.1959. It was nearly pointed out as a fact within the book I have.

But in reference to the newer map (attached and found in the forum), the route to Otorten over the top of the hills, is marked as a possible way.
And it was also in the past used from the mansi.
So, yes, they didn't walked a long way on the 01.02.1959.
But the route seems not to be wrong.

Or are there facts that underline, that they where in the wrong route? What is your status on this point.

The Dyatlov Group obviously had a plan. They would have used maps to help formulate said plan. But remember, plans can be changed sometimes for practical reasons like very bad weather, or maybe they just fancied trying a slightly different route. And there could be a more sinister reason; maybe they were being pursued by something.   

[Hunter]

The stop was clearly forced. The question is what forced them to do so: an injury to one of the expedition members or worsening weather conditions. I see no real evidence that an overnight stay at that location was planned in advance.

[GlennM]

If they stopped short owing to an injury, then we should be able to figure out who it was from the autopsy reports. If it was a ankle or lower leg injury, I would expect bindings and a splint. If a head injury, I'd expect bandaging. Then, I would consider the risk to benefits of all going to the forest below or sending one or two to fetch wood. If a delegation was going for wood, I would expect the stove slung in preparation for the firewood.

On the other hand, if they were all well and the weather was severe, then stopping and pitching a tent makes more practical sense than blindly going forward or retreating a second time.

In the event the tent was made and all were agreed to settle in for the night, only the blowdown of the tent might prompt them to abandon their camp. I have a tough time with this for the same reason that I have a tough time with people abandoning a leaky boat. If either tent or boat can be repaired, then do it! They must have made a rational decision that re erecting the tent was just inviting more damage.

In summary, I do not think the minor injuries justify stopping short of Otorten. I think the major injuries do not justify quitting the tent. I believe that the group was prepared to wait out the weather at their last camp, but their equipment was not suited to the location and collapsed. I think they might have wanted to stay but appreciated the futility of trying to get back into the tent only to be trapped in it. If they cut the tent for shoulder shawls, they would risk losing their gear and probably have to pay for the loss of the tent. I see no possibility of them putting on boots to ski away from their camp. The descent on run away skis would surely be unwise. My guess is they perhaps left the tent alone considering it to be another labaz until such time as they could gather themselves up to complete the hike. Since they did not grab packs nor food. I suppose they thought that the weather from the previous days would be predictive of an improvement.

[SURI]

Their final stop and the subsequent abandonment of the tent were not accidental.