I decided to post in the general discussion because there's very little engagement in the specific topic. Enjoy reading.
This story is not mine. It is a summary of part of a research project conducted by two deceased former Soviet intelligence officers, Viktor Belinsky and Sergei Voronin, both World War II combatants involved in
the 1959 incident. In the following decades, separated among different institutions, both served in conflict zones while investigating the state-covered case, eventually reuniting in 1988 at the Bukhara dacha, where Belinsky revealed the secret of the incident before both were arrested, retired in 1989, and took the mystery to the grave when they died in 2009 and 2012.
The story surrounding the Dyatlov group is rather curious: it's common to find supposed researchers claiming to have unraveled the great secret of the case, although no theory supposedly manages to solve the labyrinth, there are skeptics who come close. But none of them can answer all the "thorny points" of what happened. I harshly criticize the research community and the internet channels dedicated to the case, accusing them of transforming the mystery into a commercial entertainment product,
generating engagement, clicks, and donations by promising sensationalist solutions that are constantly postponed. And today, it's not about investigating what really happened, but rather what people
*want* to believe. When people approach a case with a preconceived conclusion, it's easy to fit the facts into what they consider to be the absolute truth. The brain abhors a vacuum, but loves stories that entertain it and confirm its expectations; a rigorous study of the Dyatlov case is a pursuit for the few, while for
many, it serves as a way to satisfy their own internal fantasies. When someone presents a solid theory and establishes rules that require serious study and research, many don't even dare to get
involved, knowing that it could jeopardize something they consider part of their identity.
Before asking any questions or raising objections about the case, the “investigators” should know what they are talking about. Let's start slowly: What do you really know about the USSR? What do you know about its legislature, behaviors, customs, expectations, philosophy, history… or is what you
think you know fueled by Hollywood and completely unqualified authors? Know that if you don't have the capacity to argue well, that's okay; it's good to recognize that you don't possess all the certainties in the world and say: I don't know, but I'll try to find out. And that's how it's done. When someone is locked up, they first check where the lost key is instead of banging their head against the door hoping to unlock it.
And that's the same behavior that the Dyatlov researchers have. Besides many being completely unqualified, they want to give their opinion on what they don't know even though they aren't sure (they aren't sure of anything!) - but okay! It's a democratic environment, everyone can argue. So I'll ask some very easy questions:
-According to Soviet tourism and mountaineering laws in 1959, what would happen to Igor Dyatlov once he returned to Sverdlovsk?
- Why was a radiological examination required on the bodies found in May?
- Why was Krivonischenko's body buried in a closed coffin?
- Why did the investigation into the case begin on February 6th?
- Does anyone know what really happened during the detention at the train station?
Based on the tools we have—that is, diaries, documents, photographs, and accounts—it can be a little difficult to answer. But every question has an answer, however uncomfortable it may be. In this case, it's like trying to screw in a bolt with a hammer: you can use it as a nail, but never as a screw.
This is the point of view that ordinary people have of the case, and this is one of the reasons why it attracts so much attention, and from there completely bizarre explanations arise:
murders, UFOs, Magic Portals, ball lightning and other nonsense. Here I make
Rakitin's words my own, and everything he used to destroy these theories I repeat again, and although I admire his reconstruction and narration from a factual point of view, his analysis is completely wrong.
No one from the Dyatlov Group was assassinated. No one. Not directly.
I know little about the author, Voronin. He was involved in the Afghan conflict, and his headquarters were located in the city of Fergana, in the Uzbek SSR (And no,
I'm not Uzbek). He was involved in counterintelligence operations and, of course, border security.
As a good employee, he never broke confidentiality during his work. A man of honor. The same applies to Belinsky. They had similar jobs, although they worked for different institutions. Disciplined and very capable men of honor. Voronin, after the dismantling of the country, fell into paranoia and depression.
This did not stop him from continuing what he had been doing for decades: investigating what
really happened in the "1959 incident": In the 1990s, with the opening of secret files and greater freedom
afforded by Glasnost, investigating the event became easier (and of course, he had many privileged contacts), where access to secret documents became as common as reading a TASS article.
In the last 20 years of their lives, Voronin and Belinsky were able to reconstruct what had happened in 1959. And I'm not just talking about the "Dyatlov Group
Tragedy," but the "1959 Incident."
Belinsky, like many orphans in the post-war period, was relocated to specialized military academies (especially those with partisan experience). The record places Belinsky in Timișoara, in the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, during the period 1948–1958. The truth is that in this period, before the reference to 1948, Belinsky also appears under the line “12th Special Purpose Carpathian
Detachment”. The page does not make it entirely clear, due to the text layout, how this unit relates to the
interval “1948–1958 — 33rd Guards Mechanized Division”. Out of fidelity to the source, both records are maintained without attempting to reconcile them, but we can deduce what it refers to, since he graduated
as a third-class sergeant, having completed his training in the previous three years at the military schools in Gorky and Skhodnya. In 1958–1959, he appeared at the Sverdlovsk Higher Mountain Training Center for Intelligence Officers, associated with the 7th Directorate; in 1959, he received the designation of Senior Instructor. For “some reason,” in 1959 he was transferred to the Far Eastern
Military District — 45th Army Corps. (Let's remember that serving in the Far Eastern Military District (in 1959) was not a position of great prestige—even less so for an officer like Belinsky!), in the month of June
Similarly, the same thing happened to Voronin, but I don't have information about where he served in the following years. We know today that he was at the Zhiguli Mountain Training Center until 1959, having served there for 7 years… until he was transferred in May.
So we have two officers trained in military schools specializing in mountainous terrain (something relatively rare during the "atomic age") who were near the Urals in 1959... and were removed from their posts in May of that year.
However, evidence suggests they were operating in the area where the accident occurred: When they
were retired in 1989, they were questioned by the Ministry of the Interior (the MVD). At that time, the report's dossier was filed away, only to be released years later during the Yeltsin era. Today, the document
is classified and cannot be released (restricted by articles 275 and 283 of the penal code). There wasn't much relevant information (only for military science enthusiasts).
The document allowed us to state that:
They were both born in 1929; they shared the same partisan group from 1943–1945; their specializations diverged; both changed roles in 1959; they had long operational careers; and both retired around the same time.
It is not possible to state, without additional documentation: that the 1959 transfers were punishments, deliberate dismissals, or the consequence of an incident; that the decorations prove participation in specific actions beyond the explicitly noted associations; or that the simultaneous retirement was planned as
part of the same decision. The files present two veterans of the same generation with shared experiences, but with increasingly distinct
institutional destinies. The 1959 transfers, the operations mentioned in the late 1980s, and the
retirement of both in the late 1980s form the main points of comparison. These are relevant chronological clues, not documentary explanations in themselves.
The interrogations establish only a partial set of facts, observations, indirect accounts, and hypotheses. There are testimonies that twelve men died during a clandestine operation associated with the location of an unknown object; that there were abnormal levels of radiation; that three bodies were found near the
object; and that a later team recovered and transported it by helicopter. The interrogations do not definitively determine what the object was, its origin, the exact cause of death, who received the material after its removal, or what its final destination was. The “1959 incident” therefore remains without a definitive resolution.
Based on this single document, it is possible to speculate about what may have happened and why the matter has resurfaced 30 years later. Little is known about the fate of these two officers in the years following the end of the USSR. We know that after the 1990s they were no longer in the Russian Federation and that they continued to investigate the case.
To ensure the integrity of my contact, I will not disclose their name, but rather a trusted source who served in the same theater of operations as Belinsky and Voronin.
He was not subordinate to them, nor did he maintain contact with them, but he managed to obtain the
Interview. It was conducted between 2006-2007, years before their deaths.
Voronin, already ill and weakened at the time, revealed some of the details of the research he had conducted.
Information regarding “Date?, time?, when?, how?, where? and why?” will be revealed during the explanation.
In the late 1950s, the Soviet High Command and General Staff theorists theorized that World War III was not a repetition of the large trench warfare of World War II, but an instantaneous and total thermonuclear conflict, where time and strategic surprise determined national survival. The top priority was the development of nuclear missiles and rockets. World War II had demonstrated how air power
caused devastating destruction, and in a future conflict, it would be crucial to the outcome. However, the USSR ended the conflict lagging behind in this type of weapon, and throughout the 1950s, the Soviet technological deficiency in the development of high-power, long-lasting aircraft engines for heavy strategic bombers was the determining factor that forced the Soviet Union to skip stages in aviation and invest massively in ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles).
To enable an attack against Western NATO forces, the USSR exhaustively prepared to maintain its
advantage in a nuclear conflict. One of the main tactics, as Viktor Suvorov writes, was the strategy of "terrorism" to secure the initiativ,e in the conflict before the nuclear warheads were launched, followed by
conventional forces: He argues that the absolute principle of gray terror is plausible deniability. The actions are never carried out in the name of the Soviet Union. They are
committed under the guise of local extremist organizations, fictitious terrorist groups, radical
environmental movements, or subversive unions that have no official connection with Moscow. He also argues that "pink terror" would be the phase that occurs in the last days and hours of peace, even
before large-scale conventional military operations have officially begun.
As we know, it wasn't the USSR that started World War III. They didn't have the claimed capability at the time. As Khrushchev said, manufacturing "missiles like sausages" was a bluff used to project the
fictitious power of Soviet capabilities. The same applied to the "Bomber Gap" bluff (The central premise was the widespread fear that the Soviet Union was producing and launching intercontinental jet strategic bombers at a rate and in quantities far exceeding those of the United States, leaving American territory vulnerable
to a surprise attack.) While the USSR bluffed about its nuclear capabilities, Khrushchev managed to strategically position Soviet hegemony on the geopolitical chessboard, as demonstrated in Suez and the Berlin Ultimatum. But they were far more vulnerable…
At the same time that the USSR was investing in the development of offensive missiles, a great effort was also given to air defense missiles, by the PVO, which was the branch...
An independent and elite military force, structured to protect all Soviet territory against strategic incursions. The PVO was organized as follows: The central structure was divided into Interceptor Fighter Forces (SU-9 and MiG-19 fighters), Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops (SAM, which were beginning to expand the SA-1 and SA-2 systems), and Radio Technician Troops.
The Warning Network and the P-30 Radars: The detection of intruders at high altitudes depended on the PVO's circular scanning radar network, most notably the P-30 radar, which had been introduced in
the mid-1950s. However, it had technological limitations in coverage and interception at, PVO suffered
high altitudes against spy aircraft such as the American U-2s, where SU-9 and MiG-19 interceptors were unable to intercept. When the radars detected anomalies coming from the poles or unusual routes, the alert immediately went up the military chain of command until it woke up Nikita Khrushchev himself, highlighting the strategic and sensitive nature that the PVO represented for state security.
During the interview, Belinsky stated that in the last months of 1958, an anomalous signal was detected by Soviet P-30 radars, positioned on the polar route towards the Urals. They detected a solitary contact
with an extremely low profile advancing from the Barents Sea. It wasn't a massive bomber formation, but the altitude and trajectory were disconcerting: the radar echo pinpointed the intruder flying at an
incredible 21,000 meters altitude and maintaining a constant speed. For the Soviet operators on the radar screen, this could only mean one thing: it was a typical flight of American U-2 spy planes, operating from
Arctic airspace and crossing borders at a level where conventional defense systems were practically ineffective (the more modern SA-2 missiles were not operating on that route). A short distance away, at one of the PVO's early warning bases equipped with the latest technology that the Soviet industry
had just introduced, the immediate takeoff alarms sounded, and interceptor fighters were dispatched. However, the physics of aviation imposed a cruel and insurmountable limit.
According to Belinsky, Serov ordered that no general alert be given to the population or local
defenses of Sverdlovsk that could attract curious onlookers. Instead of activating a conventional military division, he personally activated his network of trust—selecting Major Sergei Voronin and ordering the immediate mobilization of the clandestine 12-man team under the bureaucratic guise of a routine inspection in the Ural taiga.
As previously reported, the USSR was preparing for a nuclear war on the European plains, and its entire military apparatus was shaped for this purpose. Therefore, troops specialized in mountain warfare no longer existed in the 1950s (as did the then-defunct naval infantry), as their purpose was useless in Western European territory. Thus, it became necessary to call upon experienced veterans of the mountain wars of World War II, where the Red Army mobilized thousands of border warfare specialists, initially deployed to the border with Romania in 1941. But it was in the following two years that these units reached their peak, with intense fighting in the Caucasus Mountains.
That's when an intelligence agent is selected, previously serving in SMERSH and at that time an instructor at the Minsk Institute of Physical Education, and his name was Semyon Zolotarev.
Semyon Zolotaryov, whose given name was Semyon but who preferred to be called
Sasha—a name that appears in many documents and memoirs—was born in the —,
North Caucasus, in the village of Udobnoy, on the border with the Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where he regularly visited his mother.
The son of a paramedic and a member of the Kuban Cossacks, Semyon belonged to the generation most severely affected by the Great Patriotic War, in which the
military conscription of the 1921-1922 classes had a survival rate of only about 3%. He served in the Armed Forces throughout the war, from October 1941 to May 1946, becoming a candidate member of the CPSU(b) in 1944, serving as a Komsomol officer in a battalion and definitively joining the party after the conflict, in addition to being decorated
with four military medals. His military past plays a special role in the events of that tragic night.
After the war ended, Semyon attempted to continue his military career. In June 1945, he enrolled in the Moscow Military Engineering School, an institution that suffered an almost immediate downsizing; then, in April 1946, he transferred to the Leningrad Military Engineering School as part of his studies, but this too was eventually dismantled, signaling that a career in the army was not his destiny. Faced with this, he ended up enrolling in the Minsk Institute of Physical Education (GIFKB), where he successfully completed his training (in 1950/1951). In the mid-1950s, he worked as a sports
instructor at the "Artybash" tourist base in Altai, and later moved to the Sverdlovsk region, taking a job as a senior tourism instructor at the Kourovka tourist base.
However, even before the hike to the Otorten peak with Igor Dyatlov's group, Semyon left Kourovka.
Semyon was the oldest and most mysterious member of the group. He was single—which was quite unusual for the time—had a gold tooth, and possessed several tattoos. Most
of these marks were hidden under his clothes, so the other members of the Dyatlov group knew nothing about them. Zolotaryov's tattoos were quite interesting: among them were images of a five-pointed star, a heart and fire, and a strange shape resembling beets (recorded in the case files as "beets"), which were actually Spades. There was
also the name "ÿÿÿÿ" (Guena), his year of birth "1921", the word "ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿ" (DAERMMUZAUAYA), and the formula "ÿ+ÿ+ÿ=ÿ".
This last one was a common combination among Soviet soldiers who served together for a long time, in which the Russian letter "ÿ" meant "ÿÿÿÿÿÿ" (friendship) and the other three letters represent the initials of the three soldiers, with "ÿ" referring to "ÿÿÿÿÿ" (Semyon in Russian), while the other two identities remain unknown. Furthermore, it bore the inscription "ÿ + ÿ" and individual "C" letters located near the star and the
beet-heart-fire design. This was the man who was serving as an instructor at Kourovka at the time of his death.
And here again I echo Rakitin's words about the mysterious past of Zolotarev, here… no further words are needed. The former combatant of the Caucasus mountains didn't need any level III mountaineering certificate, and was
certainly more qualified for this job.
Zolotarev was supposed to work together with Dyatlov (who knew the area better; he was supposed to bring his comrades, organizing for this purpose back in 1958).
Belinsky states that the remaining members of the group did not know exactly the purpose of the
mission, and were supposed to return to Ivdel at the end of the trip, with the group being received as heroes of the city. The matter would later be kept secret, with the group of 9 non-status security
specialists, with a specialized group waiting for them at the outpost 85 km north of Ivdel, with the other 3 agents providing support and heavy equipment, and this meeting took place on January 26th. From
there they marched parallel with the Dyatlov Group, traveling another 48 km northwest to the search area.
, the groups of three
The PVO watched helplessly from the P-30 radar consoles as the aircraft flew over the operational ceiling of its fighter aviation. Without fighter opposition and before the anti-aircraft missile network could reconfigure itself on the ground, the aircraft
maintained its cruising altitude, aligned its course, and supposedly released a device towards Soviet soil in the region near Mount Otorten.
As head of the KGB, Serov was not just the head of the KGB; he was a man
obsessed with absolute power, political survival, and military technological innovation. He knew that if the GRU or the Ministry of Defense (led by Malinovsky)
discovered an intact American technological prototype first, the KGB's prestige and budget would be eclipsed. Therefore, Serov kept the intelligence absolutely secret within the Politburo itself. He didn't officially activate the PVO to prevent the General Staff from taking control of the drop zone. Instead, he formed a "white" and autonomous team—mediated at the time by Major Sergei Voronin, then a senior instructor at the Zhiguli Mountain Training Center. A provisional team of 12 agents was formed, 4
of whom were official members, while the others would maintain the technical and scientific role of the expedition, to avoid suspicion. The two teams were formed,
with the 9 main agents (including agent Zolotarev) leaving Sverdlovsk to meet deep in the taiga with the group of three who would provide support and professional equipment.
However, Serov was the last major living figure from the Beria era still in power. He
had been Beria's deputy in the NKVD, which organized mass deportations in the Baltics and the Caucasus, participated in Katyn, and personally commanded the
repression of the 1956 Counter-Revolution. Khrushchev needed to
sell the idea of "de-Stalinization" and a new, cleaner KGB to the West. And keeping Serov, a known executioner, as the first head of the KGB was impossible. He was replaced by Alexander Shelepin, a young Komsomol member with no NKVD past, precisely to project this image of renewal. His move to the GRU was a way to remove him
from the spotlight without arresting him. It functioned as a prestigious exile. On paper, he was… The head of military intelligence: to collect secrets about weapons, plans, and technology from NATO and the US. And that was exactly what he needed.
So Serov politicized the GRU as if it were the KGB. He took his security officers, set up brutal internal control, and treated military intelligence as ideological counterintelligence. Army officers
complained that he didn't understand military analysis, only hunting "internal enemies." The mission was already planned and underway, and Serov's influence over the KGB was still considerable.
He points out that then-Major Voronin was in direct command of the team stationed on the banks of the Lozva River, awaiting the arrival of the clandestine team.
The Operation:
January 23, 1959
What happened: The group left by train from the city of Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg). The
original team consisted of 10 members: Igor Dyatlov (leader), Yuri Yudin, Aleksander Kolevatov, Zinaida Kolmogorova, Yuri Krivonischenko, Rustem Slobodin, Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolle, Lyudmila Dubinina, Semyon Zolotaryov and Yuri Doroshenko.
The group departed by train on January 23rd, arrived in Serov on January 24th, were prevented from entering the station with their backpacks, took shelter in a railway school (No. 41) where they interacted with children, gave talks on tourism, and spoke with the students.
Belinsky points out that this school in Serov never existed (proven by long-time residents and local teachers), making the entire story of the visit to the children a literary invention to mask the period when the group was gathered to prepare for the real reason for the expedition. Furthermore, he questions the photographs and states that the narrative that the students were expelled from the station is absurd, since passengers with tickets have a legal right to the waiting room.
Means of Transportation: Passenger train.
Overnight stay/Accommodation point: Train carriage during transit.
January 24, 1959
What happened: Arrival in the industrial city of Serov in the morning. While waiting for their next transport, the participants spent the day in the city, visited a local school and “talked to the children” about trekking
and travel.
The Dyatlov and Blinov groups traveled on the same train, but in separate carriages, and encountered an incident with a young alcoholic that resulted in police intervention.
Belinsky treats these episodes as "noise" details placed in the diaries merely to give a false sense of verisimilitude and fill the pages with… unreal adventures, highlighting the total lack of authentic photographic evidence of this stretch, suggesting a covert operation.
Means of Transportation: Passenger train (arrival) and walking around the city.
Place of Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Serov train station, and later they boarded the night train to Ivdel.
January 25, 1959
What happened: The group arrived in the early morning hours in Ivdel, the last major urban center in the region. From there, they took a rustic bus in the middle of the night towards the village of Vizhai. “The groups rented or 'hijacked' a packed truck/bus (GAZ-51) heading towards Vizhay on January
25th. On the way, there was a stop; four members stayed behind running after the vehicle, and a mysterious girl helped stop it.” Belinsky points out that the photographs of this bus trip are crude collages or taken
from inside train carriages. He ironically criticizes the convoluted narrative of the students running dozens of kilometers after the vehicle in the taiga, classifying it as yet another artificial element added to force coherence with the fake photos, where the group's real motive was a localized encounter with the region's military.
What the “official” version says: They arrived in Vizhay on January 25th, where they watched a film (“The Golden Symphony”), met with Blinov's group, and visited senior forest ranger Ivan Rempel to copy maps and plan their route. However, Belinksy highlights Vizhay as the “alpha and omega” of the hoax. He points out severe contradictions between Dyatlov's diaries and the later testimonies of participants in
Blinov's group (such as Valentina Martyusheva/Tamilova) regarding when and where the groups separated (whether in Vizhay or at the 100th section). Regarding the meeting with Rempel, he questions why the
forest ranger would specifically remember that group among so many passing through the region, suggesting that the witnesses' testimonies were later shaped by the authorities.
Means of Transport: Train (arrival in Ivdel) and local bus (unpaved road to Vizhai). Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Simple community hotel/hostel in the Vizhai settlement.
January 26, 1959
What happened: In the morning, the group hitched a ride on a logging truck from Vizhai to Camp 41 (a settlement of loggers/geologists). The journey was freezing in the open back of the truck. Upon arrival, they were warmly welcomed and chatted with the workers. A few hours later, the group moved 8 km south towards Settlement 55 (55th Kvartal), which was located on a fairly feasible and nearby route towards Mount Chistop (the distance from it being practically the same as from Settlement 41), exactly east of Mount Chistop, which makes its topographical location easy.
Means of Transportation: Timber truck (open tipper).
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Workers'/loggers' accommodation at Camp 41 (41st Kvartal).
January 27, 1959. What
happened: Official start of the snow trek. The group hired a local resident (member of the Mansi people) and his horse with a cart/sled to carry the backpacks and heavy equipment to the abandoned settlement of the "2nd Northern Village," where they lifted the equipment provided by the Group of 3 from Block 55 (55th Kvartal). They walked alongside DP9, and their presence was erased from photographs (including the famous photograph of the five-legged, two-headed horse). The trekkers followed the route skiing along the Lozva River to increase their chances of being found.
Means of Transportation: Skis (for the group) and Sled/Horse-drawn cart (for luggage).
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Abandoned wooden houses in the 2nd Northern Settlement.
January 28, 1959. What
happened: The group traveled by truck to Block 41 (41st Kvartal) on January 26, stayed with the lumberjacks, hired a horse with a sled (driven by "Grandpa Slava" / Velikiavichus) to carry their backpacks on January 27/28 towards the abandoned 2nd Northern Village. On the way, Yuri Yudin fell ill with sciatica attacks and returned with the horse.
Yuri Yudin's "farewell." Due to "severe chronic pain," Yuri Yudin realized he could not continue
the journey safely and decided to return. The group continued northward, following the Lozva River. Yudin returned with Velikiavichus and became the sole survivor of the group.
Belinsky refutes this false story by cross-referencing the testimonies of Ryazhnev, Dryakhlykh, and Velikiavichus with the diaries, and asserts that the departure times, the distances traveled on foot versus on horseback, and Yudin's return time present impossible mathematical and physical inconsistencies (such as
speeds incompatible with the weight of 400 kg of luggage and implausible temperatures of +5°C at the end of January in the Urals). He also points out that abandoning a sick companion in harsh conditions would violate basic rules of morality and the Soviet tourism manual itself, suggesting that the story of Yudin being left behind hides real motives very different from those reported, where Igor Dyatlov would be arrested and brutally punished for abandoning his companion, who, considering those conditions, had low chances of survival. It can therefore be concluded that Yudin returned with information about the exact location
of the artifact, as well as the information obtained by the research of the group of agents from Block 55 (55th Kvartal).
Means of Transportation: Skis (now the group of 9 people was carrying all their own backpacks).
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Tent camping on the banks of the Lozva River.
January 29, 1959. What
happened: The group advances along the Auspiya River, following trails and hunting marks carved into the trees by the native Mansi people. The walk gradually slows down due to the increasing thickness
of the snow.
Means of Transportation: Skis.
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Tent camping on the banks of the Auspiya River.
January 30, 1959. What
happened: The advance continued through the Auspiya River valley. The weather began to deteriorate,
and the wind blew strongly against the group. The logbook reports that they continued following the tracks of the Mansi hunters.
Means of Transportation: Skis.
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Tent camping in the Auspiya River valley.
January 31, 1959. What
happened: The group reaches the base of the slope and attempts to cross the mountain pass to the Kholat River valley. Extremely strong winds and low visibility force them to retreat to the tree line in the Auspiya valley. They decide to set up a supply base (called Labaz) to leave provisions and equipment unnecessary for the main ascent, relieving the weight of their backpacks for the return journey.
Means of Transportation: Skis.
Accommodation/Overnight Stay: Campsite on the edge of the forest, at the base of Kholat Syakhl mountain (Auspiya River valley).
February 1, 1959. What happened:
In the morning, the group builds the Labaz structure (a food and equipment storage facility under the snow) before meeting up with the group of three scouts.
The original objective: The initial approved plan was for the group to head north in the Ural Mountains to climb the Otorten peak.
On the afternoon of February 1, 1959, while attempting to cross the mountain pass towards the river valley to meet the agents' camp, the young men, due to adverse conditions, ended up veering to the left, climbing the slope of Kholat Syakhl mountain, where the other group was observing the forest below. Their position was revealed by a signal pistol shot from the second group (According to the theory, the three scouts were present—which could explain the strange light phenomena and unusual photographs associated with the incident. The Dyatlov group allegedly deviated from their planned route to meet them, while the scouts were setting up an optical rangefinder to triangulate the position of the object.) The second group, consisting of the three radio operators scouts, had a crucial role. They were to: establish communication; contact the helicopters; coordinate the extraction; and maintain communication with the Committee of State security. The decision to camp on the hillside was made by the group of agents who had a good view of the valley, along the forest. Around 5 pm, they began climbing the slope of Kholat Syakhl mountain ("Mountain of the Dead" in the Mansi language).
The bag that held the optical rangefinder was left in the tent, where the rescue team mistook it for "a blanket." The other team was also carrying an extra pickaxe and more skis.
At that moment, the excavation was underway by the group of agents; part of the group was in the already set up tent.
At night, they have dinner, prepare their sleeping bags, and write an informal satirical journal called "The Will of the Event".
Then, the incident occurred.
Around 9 or 10 p.m., Semyon Zolotarev and Thibaux-Brignolles were on guard outside the tent when dozens of ice slabs and fragments began to fall down the slope. Convinced of the imminent danger, he ordered the immediate evacuation of the perimeter. The tent canvas was torn from the inside with a knife to allow a quick glance at the sky and an immediate escape, without time to put on boots or heavy coats. The group descended the slope in single file, with calculated steps ("protruding footprints"), maintaining tactical cohesion to avoid tripping on the rocky and uneven terrain (kurumi). In the darkness, intense katabatic winds lift the snow from the ground (prikzemnaya).
The northeast direction was, under normal circumstances, probably the worst possible choice for the group. They were unfamiliar with that route, while the south direction was familiar due to their previous movements and led them towards the labaz, where they had food, felt boots, and other supplies. The northeast route also left them further from these supplies and exposed them to icy winds, making it a considerably more dangerous direction for survival. If the group had simply been trying to reach a safe location, returning south towards the labaz would have been the most logical choice; however, considering that the Dyatlov group had no other choice, we conclude that the landslide occurred at the high altitudes of
the mountain. As a World War II veteran and experienced mountaineer, Zolotarev judged that, in this context, moving northeast, away from the apparent source of danger, would have transformed the worst geographical direction into the safest tactical option, in his judgment. Therefore, the group may not have chosen the northeast because it was objectively safer, but rather because Zolotarev believed it to
be the safest direction in response to the perceived threat. With zero visibility and no visual
references in the darkness, the group becomes disoriented, searching for the labaz (the food supply they had left the previous day) and finally arrives at the edge of the forest, at the bed of a stream. Under Zolotarev's tactical command, the group decided to dig a trench in the deep snow of the ravine to protect themselves from the impacts of snow and strong winds, building a wooden platform (the trench) with 14 birch branches on the rocky stream bed. The three agents who were inspecting the device gave no sign of life.
While the members were working or already lying on the platform, the roof of the trench was covered in snow (or a mass of snow accumulated on the edge of the channel by the wind). It gave way and collapsed. The weight of tons of snow that suddenly fell pressed their bodies
against the hard rocks of the streambed. Lyudmila Dubinina and Semyon Zolotarev suffered severe rib fractures. Thick clothing and a layer of soft snow prevented cuts or bruises, but the force of the impact fractured the internal bone structure.
The bodies of Dubinina, Kolevatov, Zolotarev, and Thibeaux-Brignolles were found approximately 5.5 meters from the platform—which, according to this reconstruction, was not the
exact location of the initial accident. After the group reached the ravine and began building Zolotarev's shelter, the first collapse occurred directly on or very near the platform, seriously injuring Dubinina and Zolotarev. The other seven then dug through the snow and carried their injured companions to the deepest part of the ravine, where the bodies were later discovered.
Upon finding two comrades severely wounded and dying in the ravine, the group organized a rescue operation divided into three fronts:
Slope Group (Dyatlov, Kolmogorova, and Slobodin): In a heroic mission, the three began climbing the icy mountain against the wind to retrieve medicine, sleeping bags, and clothing from their tent.
Slobodin, who suffered a fractured temporal bone after being struck by loose rocks (kurumi) resulting from landslides on the mountain's summit in the dark, managed to reach 1,000 meters from the cedar tree before collapsing. Dyatlov and Kolmogorova succumbed to hypothermia shortly after him, falling in single file towards the summit.
Cedar Group (Doroshenko and Krivonischenko): Tasked with lighting and maintaining a fire under the large cedar tree, which served as a landmark and signal in the darkness, Krivonischenko climbed the tree,
more than 5 meters high, to try to spot the mountain. With his hands and feet frozen, he lost his balance, fell from the branches into the fire, and suffered a deep burn on his leg before dying of hypothermia along with Doroshenko.
The Ravine Group (Kolevatov and Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolle): Unharmed in the collapse, Kolevatov and Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolle provided first aid in the ravine. Upon realizing their companions were dead in the cedar, they used a knife to tear pieces of clothing from the bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonischenko and covered the feet and shoulders of Dubinina and Zolotarev. At that moment, Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolle
was struck on the head by a piece of snow slab and was rescued by Kolevatov to the ravine, where he remained with the wounded until he died of hypothermia, clinging to their bodies.
The 12 involved were at the location. At a certain point: 9 from the Dyatlov group went to rest/sleep; and the 3 agents remained with the device. These three had the task of: manipulating the device; examining it; investigating its characteristics; establishing the necessary communications. During this
The manipulation was the central event. The incident was accidental. It was not a planned attack. It was not a deliberate order to activate the object. The agents' actions during the manipulation/investigation triggered the incident. And the result was catastrophic.
After days without any communication or response from the expedition members, the search process was ordered to begin (February 6).
The 7th Directorate of the Sverdlovsk Higher Center for Mountain Intelligence Officers was
mobilized on Serov's orders, with Major Belinsky being the officer in charge of investigating the accident (Members of Belinsky's team can be easily recognized in photos of the Dyatlov Group, as they are wearing camouflage overalls).
When Soviet forces arrived, they observed: radiation anomalies; unusual weather effects; and changes concentrated in the region of the incident. The anomalies did not spread indefinitely throughout the region. They were essentially limited to the area where the incident had occurred.
Belinsky was sent as part of one of the teams responsible for the investigation.
He wasn't the only force on the scene. There were two other teams involved. The subsequent operation was much larger than simply "searching for the missing." And there were different components: Belinsky's Team, the main search and rescue force commanded by Army units. The local Air Force provided support to the operation.
Civilians were also mobilized as auxiliary forces.
Therefore, the recovery has become a joint military operation of great importance.
Belinsky recalls that he couldn't simply approach the object. Teams detected radiation. The area was considered dangerous, and it was necessary to call in a specialized radiological warfare team.
(One of the soldiers dressed in a radiation protection suit can be seen near Rustem Slobodin's body in the full photo.) This team carried out: assessment, decontamination, technical support, and preparation
of the area for the approach of the forces. Decontamination occurred quickly. After that, Belinsky was able to approach the wreckage.
Upon the team's approach, Belinsky did not recognize the object. He had never seen anything like it, never heard of anything similar, and didn't fully understand its nature. Even as an experienced officer, this was outside his area of expertise. He didn't know what it was.
The specialized team participated in the decontamination and also assisted in the removal. The device was prepared, extracted by helicopter, and removed from the area. But there is a fundamental distinction: the artifact did not remain under the control of Belinsky's formation. It was transferred to another division/formation of the GRU.
Belinsky lost access to the case. After that, he was never again able to directly follow the artifact's fate.
Then-Major Belinsky knew the object was extremely important, that something extraordinary had happened, that there were bodies of KGB agents, that anomalies existed, that the artifact had been activated, that the object was destroyed, and that the State considered it highly sensitive. But
he didn't know exactly what the artifact was. And, most importantly: Belinsky never definitively discovered what happened at that location. Belinsky directly investigated the situation involving
the three operators who died alongside the artifact. However, he never managed to understand exactly what had happened to them. This point became one of the biggest questions of his life. The three operators died in different circumstances from the other nine and were directly next to the artifact, and their bodies were not returned to their families. The other nine from the first team had different fates. Their bodies were returned to their families. The official justifications were fragmented. The recorded causes were: 1 died of a skull fracture, 2 died of physical trauma to the chest, 6 died of hypothermia; 3 were officially considered dead in military exercises.
Here there is a deliberately strange peculiarity: the documentation presents numbers/categories that do not transparently correspond to the total number of 12 dead. This is part of the fragmented nature of the cover-up.
The three agents received different treatment. Their bodies were never returned to their families. The state kept these bodies out of the normal process of restitution and burial. This reinforces the idea that they were directly related to what had happened with the artifact.
The main visual evidence of the incident consists of photographs. These photographs were taken by members of the official teams involved in the operation. There is no confirmation from an independent photographer. After the incident, the area remained restricted for three years. There were relentless searches. The goal was to locate every last piece of evidence that might have remained at the site. And in the end: nothing remained. No known physical evidence was left in the area. Therefore, there was no public announcement. There was no known formal closure. There was no satisfactory official
explanation. The case was simply closed quietly. After the operation, the cameras and the photographs were collected and the films were confiscated. Everything was meticulously inspected; the photographic evidence was placed under seal. Kolevatov's diary was confiscated.
However, there is a possibility: some participant may have hidden a camera or some photographs before handing the material over to the State, which is why there may be rumors of leaked photographs. But their authenticity never needs to be guaranteed.
Twenty-nine years later, then-Colonels Belinsky and Voronin met and formulated their hypotheses about what might have happened that night. Interestingly, both colonels were arrested by the Soviet MVD shortly afterward and subsequently retired. In the interview, Voronin revealed that:
In 1958, working in the Kuibyshev region, near the Zhiguli Mountains, a mission of twelve specialists was ordered directly by Ivan Serov and kept secret. Information related to air defense indicated the presence/loss of an aircraft or unidentified object in the region, and local reports of unusual nighttime phenomena. The team was to consist of three nuclear warfare specialists, three radio operators, and six military technicians/ scientists. The objective was to locate, study, analyze, and eventually retrieve the object. The nine main members traveled through Sverdlovsk, Ivdel, and Vizhay to the area of the object; the three nuclear specialists were from Chelyabinsk-40. Voronin clarified that only these three were from Chelyabinsk-40.
Voronin hypothesized that the object might have been taken to Ozersk, especially since the
three nuclear specialists were from that region. He himself acknowledged that he had no proof of this. The specialists' origin does not confirm the object's destination. The radio operators were supposed to install an antenna on a nearby tree. According to information received by Voronin, the
installation never took place. Contact with the team was lost, and Voronin stated that he did not know directly what happened. An agent later informed Voronin that the twelve bodies had been found.
According to this account, only nine families were notified, and three men were secretly buried without their families being informed. The three radio operators were reportedly found near the object, exhibiting unusual changes and very high levels of radiation. Voronin made it clear that this information was indirect.
Voronin speculated that the fate of the case might have been discussed or decided at higher political levels, possibly in the context of the 21st Party Congress.
He mentioned the possibility of Khrushchev's involvement, but presented no proof. This connection remains speculative. Belinsky stated that he had signed a one-hundred-year confidentiality agreement and invoked this agreement to refuse to answer questions about parts of the incident. The document of the agreement was not presented.
Therefore, decades after the incident, Voronin and Belinsky developed their own theory, based on archives and documents selected throughout the 1990s.
They called it "Operation Carrington".
According to the authors:
“In 1958, Operation Carrington (named after a similar event that occurred 100 years earlier) was initiated. The X-16 aircraft (based on the Lockheed U-2A, or a version based on the RB-47A) operated at 21,000 m,
based in Bodø, Norway. Soviet defenses used P-30 radars and obsolete missiles, which had not yet managed to shoot down a U-2. The United States had tested Operation Argus in 1958, three detonations at an altitude of 200 km over the South Atlantic, proving the effects of high-altitude electromagnetic pulses.
The standard American warhead for this purpose was the W49, with a yield of 1.4 megatons in its full version, but also studied in lighter versions of 50 kilotons for testing. The modified U-2 launched a vehicle approximately 500 km from the Urals, over the Barents Sea.
An X-17 aircraft carrying an EMP nuclear warhead intended to detonate 300 km above Sverdlovsk
was detected. The Soviet P-30 radar picked up an echo at an altitude of 20 km. The speed of the aircraft was coming from the pole; it wasn't civilian. The air defense command woke Khrushchev.
The American entered and Khrushchev asked, "Is this a U-2 photo opportunity or a bomber?"
And nobody knew. In 1959, the difference was crucial. After the incident, Malinovsky told Khrushchev, “This wasn’t espionage. It was the first minute of the war.”
It was the last opportunity to win the third world war, before the "bomber gap" and "sausage-produced missiles" became an absolute superiority.
"The electromagnetic pulse bomb was meant to blind us so the rest of the bombers could come later." But according to Soviet doctrine, how were they going to retaliate? Their R-7s took 20 hours to refuel. If they had been launched, the Americans would still have had 1,500 bombers in the air. So Khrushchev held back and didn't launch. Then he made his bluff, the opposite in 1960, and detonated a 50-megaton bomb.
In his meeting with Eisenhower, he said: "We think, we know what it was, we're not going to talk about
it. But if a single plane crosses again, we will consider that the war has begun and we will launch everything we have on London, Paris and New York without warning." Then, Eisenhower got the message and understood the point. The project was canceled immediately.
So, the Soviet Union made the largest investment in history in radar and, in six months, in 1960, it
doubled the number of S-75 missiles around Moscow. And that's why nine months later, when Gary Powers'
U-2 tried to enter Soviet territory, it was shot down. The Soviets had been expecting the next one since
the day of the device. The device, however, did not detonate. Due to a failure in its ignition system, the device did not complete the explosion sequence and initiated a ballistic descent with a braking parachute,
landing intact in the remote tundra region. The battery was almost completely discharged. Given the absence of confirmation of an electromagnetic pulse flash, the American command opted not to proceed with the subsequent phases of the operation. A general abort order was issued for all formations involved. No subsequent attack was carried out. And the incident occurred.
According to Belinsky and Voronin, the warhead, although with very limited capabilities, was
activated during handling, releasing an electromagnetic pulse capable of generating geomagnetic changes in the area. According to the authors, the thin-layered ice on the slope was rapidly vaporized, causing inevitable plate detachment and avalanches. Days later, Soviet teams located the intact device. The material was recovered and transported to research facilities under absolute secrecy. Without confirmation of the bomb from shortwave monitoring in England and at the Thule base, the strategic air command
executed the abort protocol foreseen in SIOP-62, and the second wave of bombers it had in
orbit over the Arctic was ordered to return. The event is recorded internally as the loss of a test vehicle
over the sea. The device, equipped with a high-visibility parachute, landed on the tundra and was later located by support teams. Soviet protocol for objects marked with radioactivity, isolation and area designation,
and shipment to Arzamas-16, the Soviet center of Nuclear weapons activated. Both sides maintain secrecy for their own interests. The United States, to avoid exposing a failed preemptive strike attempt, and the Soviet Union, to study detonation technology and to avoid revealing that an intact device reached the Urals. In 1961 and 1962, at the Sary Shagan
test site near Karaganda, the Soviets conducted five high-altitude detonations, from 20 to 300 km, to
test precisely the reverse-engineered weapon. The K-1 in 1961, 300 kilotons at 300 km. The K-2 in 1962, 300 kilotons at 150 km. K-3, K-4, and K-5 in 1962, 300 kilotons. However, the K-3 was a failure. It burned 500 km of telephone company in Karaganda, set fire to a power plant in Astana, and fried buried cables. The largest electromagnetic pulse ever recorded to date. And because of him, the Soviets stopped testing
high. Not long after, Nikita Sergeyevich himself was found dead in his dacha. Supposedly a heart attack. And we know that many of his writings and accounts of his memoirs were taken and never seen again.”
After the fall, the Soviets visited the area, from the point of view that Voronin and Belinsky knew, and that is what happened.
The interviews establish only a partial set of facts, observations, indirect accounts, and hypotheses.
There are testimonies that twelve men died during a clandestine operation associated with the location of an unknown object; that there were abnormal levels of radiation; that three bodies were found alongside the object; and that a later team recovered and transported it by helicopter. The interrogations do not definitively determine what the object was, its origin, the exact cause of death, who received the material after its removal, or what its final destination was, leaving only room for speculation. The 1959 incident therefore remains without a definitive resolution.
Topic: Operation Carrington and the 1959 Sverdlovsk Incident (Read 337 times)