Theory of Evacuation via Air Flare and coordinated rescue (Ramsay's Theory)

[Ramsay]

My reconstruction addresses the Dyatlov Pass tragedy from a strictly rational, tactical, and physical perspective. Theories of a supernatural nature or complex plots are rejected.

The central hypothesis maintains that the event was triggered by a misinterpretation of a military signal/night vision device, in the context of the Cold War, by an experienced war veteran. From this initial misperception, a mechanical accident occurred in the pass, followed by a heroic, disciplined, and tragic rescue operation, carried out amidst the harsh climate of the Ural Mountains.


The Initial Shot and the Evacuation of the Tent (Between 9:00 PM and 10:15 PM)
Around 9:00 PM or 10:00 PM, Semyon Zolotarev and Thibaux-Brignollelle  left the tent, where the temperature was -30°C, to urinate; a fact confirmed by the stain of frozen urine identified by forensic experts on the mountaintop. Outside, Zolotarev observed a bright flash descending from a parachute (similar to OARS-57/ARS-57 ammunition dropped by aircraft during night exercises).

As a World War II infantry and sapper veteran, Zolotarev immediately associated the bright flash and smoke in the night sky with the delineation of an impact zone for aerial bombardment or artillery fire (This tactic was used in World War II, and was also used during the war in Afghanistan by the air force for artillery target designation. Zolotarev uses his Zorki camera hanging around his neck to record everything. Convinced of the imminent danger, he ordered the immediate evacuation of the perimeter. The tent canvas is torn open from the inside with a knife to allow for a quick glance at the sky and an immediate escape, without time to put on boots or heavy coats.

The group descends the slope in single file, with calculated steps ("protruding footprints"), maintaining tactical cohesion to avoid tripping on the rocky and uneven terrain (kurumi).

The magnesium flare burns for 30 to 90 seconds and goes out in mid-air, leaving the group members momentarily blind. Simultaneously, intense katabatic winds lift the snow from the ground (prikzemnaya metel).

With zero visibility and no visual references in the darkness, the group becomes disoriented, searching for the labaz (the food stock they left the previous day) and finally reaches the edge of the forest, at the bed of a stream. Later, it becomes clear that the danger was not what he had imagined.

(Between 22:15 and 23:00) The Den:
Under Zolotarev's tactical command, the group decided to dig a trench in the deep snow of the ravine to protect themselves from the strong wind, building a wooden platform (the trench) with 14 birch branches over the rocky stream bed.

(Between 23:00 and 00:30)
While the members were working or already lying on the platform, the roof of the snow trench (or a mass of snow accumulated on the edge of the channel by the wind) gave way and collapsed. The weight of tons of snow that suddenly fell pressed their bodies against the hard rocks of the stream bed. Lyudmila Dubinina and Semyon Zolotarev suffered severe rib fractures, and Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolle suffered a skull fracture. Thick clothing and a layer of soft snow prevented cuts or bruises, but the force of the impact fractured the internal bone structure.

Upon finding three severely injured companions in agony in the ravine, the group organized a rescue operation divided into three fronts:

(Between 00:30 and 5:00)

The Slope Group (Dyatlov, Kolmogorova, and Slobodin): In a heroic mission, the three began climbing the icy mountain against the wind to retrieve medicine, sleeping bags, and clothing from the tent. Slobodin, who suffered a fractured temporal bone after falling on loose rocks (kurumi) in the dark, managed to reach 1,000 meters from the cedar tree before collapsing. Dyatlov and Kolmogorova succumbed to hypothermia right behind him, falling in single file towards the summit.

The Cedar Group (Doroshenko and Krivonischenko): Tasked with lighting and maintaining a fire under the large cedar tree, which served as a landmark and signal in the darkness. Krivonischenko climbed the tree, over 5 meters high, to try to spot the mountain. With his hands and feet frozen, he lost his balance, fell from the branches into the fire, and suffered a deep burn on his leg before dying of hypothermia along with Doroshenko.


The Ravine Group (Kolevatov): Unharmed in the collapse, Kolevatov provided first aid in the ravine. Upon realizing his companions were dead in the cedar, he used a knife to tear pieces of clothing from the bodies of Doroshenko and Krivonischenko and covered the feet and shoulders of Dubinina and Zolotarev. Kolevatov remained with the wounded until he died of hypothermia, clinging to their bodies.

OBJECTIVE FACTS vs PLAUSIBLE POSSIBILITIES
To ensure methodological rigor, the theory clearly distinguishes between proven documentary data and hypotheses that seek to fill information gaps.

Objective Fact: Urine in the Snow: Stain of frozen urine identified by forensic experts near the tear in the tent at the original campsite.
Objective Fact: Camera in the Neck: Zorki camera found on Zolotarev's body inside the ravine and cataloged in the autopsy report of May 1959.
Objective Fact: Trauma without Skin Marks: Severe internal fractures in the thorax and skull without cuts, lacerations, or contusions on the skin, documented by Dr. Boris Vozrozhdenny.
Objective Fact: Organized Footprints: Aligned and rhythmic footprints descending the mountain, photographed and cataloged by the search teams.
Objective fact: Body placement: The exact positions of the Cedar, Slope, and Ravine groups were duly mapped in the official 1959 investigation.

Possibility: Activation by flare: Zolotarev observed the descent of an OARS-57/ARS-57 test flare and feared an imminent attack, which justifies the immediate evacuation, the tactical posture, and the fact that he was wearing the camera around his neck.

Possibility: Collapse into the ravine: The snowbank collapsed onto the bodies already there, acting as a hydraulic press against the rocks of the riverbed.
Possibility: Radiation source: Point-source beta contamination from radioactive dust impregnated by Krivonischenko's previous work in Mayak and Kolevatov's work at the university, transferred between tissues during shelter in the ravine.

CRITICAL POINTS AND ANOMALIES


Regarding Radiation on Clothing: The beta emission contamination on the clothing of Krivonischenko (a former Mayak nuclear power plant employee who worked during the 1957 decontamination) and Kolevatov was residual radioactive dust from their professional/academic routines. When Kolevatov tore these clothes to protect the wounded in the ravine, the contamination naturally migrated to the pieces analyzed by the experts.

The Slobodin's Fracture
Slobodin was not a victim of physical assault. He suffered a linear fracture of the temporal bone when he lost his balance and hit his head on loose rocks (kurumi) in the dark while trying to climb the slope against icy winds.

The Missing Diaries and Films
Kolevatov's personal diary and Zolotarev's camera films were confiscated by the authorities because they recorded the sky lighting, the reason for the evacuation, and the final moments in the ravine, constituting sensitive material under Cold War state secrecy.
Possibility: Start date of the process (February 6)
The KGB may have concluded that the incident was linked to the tourists' deaths, rushing into the investigation, with the case being closed shortly after the bodies were found. Possibility: Previous military operation: KGB or MVD patrols collected the debris from the flare in early February, which justifies the date 06/02 on the file cover,  and the subsequent seizure of Zolotarev's film and Kolevatov's diary.


MY CONCLUSION:

My theory restores a realistic and human dimension to the Dyatlov Pass incident. The disaster was not the result of uncontrolled paranoia or supernatural intervention (UFOs, yeti, or portals), but rather a tragic sequence of events: a visual misperception during a military exercise committed by a war veteran, followed by the relentless action of extreme weather conditions and a geological accident in the mountains. The conduct of the students and Zolotarev to the end demonstrated exceptional discipline, camaraderie, and heroism in a desperate attempt to save the wounded in the ravine.

[amashilu]

Hello, and welcome to the forum. Thank you for sharing your theory with our members.

I am stopped right at the beginning of your narrative:  "The magnesium flare burns for 30 to 90 seconds and goes out in mid-air ..."

It is over after a minute and a half max, yet the group continues to walk down the slope for a mile? Why would they not simply go back to the tent?

Other questions arise, but I'll just start with this one.

[Ramsay]

That was the minimum flare duration at the time; being experimental, it could have lasted a few more minutes... but keep reading! I'll check and research more about the duration of the light... but it was also possible that Zolotarev believed for a while that an attack was imminent, and the position below the slope might have been safer (if the light had come from the south).

[Ramsay]

I would like more people to try to refute my theory

[Ziljoe]

I don't think there were any forensic experts on the scene, it was a passing comment about that maybe there was a spot that someone urinated at. I don't know if that would last 3 weeks in the snow or if a searcher took a leak.

Flares were used a lot, by hikers for example. There would be more chance that that they thought someone needed rescuing than a bombardment .

These cameras don't work in the dark.

The hikers didn't walk in single file.

The labaz was in another direction.

Other than that , it's about as good as anyone else's.

[Ramsay]

Thanks for the feedback, Ziljoe. Here are a few clarifications on those points based on the case files and the tactical reconstruction.
Regarding the urine spot, the first searchers to reach the tent on February 26 were Boris Slobtsov and Mikhail Sharavin. Slobtsov explicitly noted frozen urine outside the tent wall, which in extreme sub-zero temperatures freezes almost instantly into a solid icy crust that easily lasts for weeks in snow. It was not left by searchers, as the area around the tent was untouched when Slobtsov and Sharavin arrived. This detail confirms that at least one member went outside right before the evacuation sequence started, aligning with a sudden external visual event while someone was briefly outside or looking out. 
Whether they interpreted the air flare as a distress signal requiring a response or a tactical signal, the behavioral response remains key. Therefore, if Zolotarev believed a bombing raid was going to happen, the safest position would be the forest they went to, in the northeast. The labaz was located to the South/Southwest in the Auspiya valley. If an air flare or rocket was fired from the South—the exact direction where other expedition groups like Shumkov's and Karelin's reported seeing strange luminous spheres in February 1959—moving toward the labaz meant walking directly toward the origin of the unknown light source. Retreating Northeast toward the Lozva valley was the safest, shortest route to immediate timberline cover away from the trigger. 
Furthermore, the footprints down the slope were organized in a spread marching formation rather than a panicked single-file scatter, indicating a disciplined, coordinated retreat under leadership like Zolotarev's to maintain group cohesion. As for the camera capabilities, while 1950s Soviet cameras like the Zorki or FED cannot shoot in pitch darkness, they easily capture intense high-altitude light sources, aerial flares, or magnesium flashes. Frame #34 on the recovered film shows an overexposed point of light against a dark background, which matches an attempt to document an aerial illumination event before or during the emergency departure.

[Ziljoe]

The only bit about urine I can recall is Tempalov saying this in the case files.

On top of the tent was Chinese flashlight, which was closer to the entrance, near the exit from the tent I found a trace of urination. This trace was old. Without me no one came into the tent and there were no tracks near the tent that were not left by us.

I can't remember if it's later interviews where Slobtsovv and Sharvin mention it or the case files. I'm also not sure where the tent wall is, which is actually interesting. I would expect urination of some sort but it doesn't give us a time or link to anything.

I don't fully understand why Zolo would expect a flare to be a bombing run and where and what set off this flare?

Fram 34 is not from zolos camera and that camera was taken from the tent . It means unpacking a camera, setting aperture and exposures and focusing, replacing the camera and putting back in the tent. It's not a quick process and I would expect to see streaks not a blurred image with no shake . But I'm not an expert on these cameras . I did try film cameras when I was young and they're quite a pain.

They are just my thoughts.

[Ramsay]

I’ll double-check if it was Slobtsov who was holding the urine sample; I might have mixed things up.
Regarding the flare: I believe it was an aerial flare fired during a military test (the OARS-57 flare was a version of the ARS-57 rocket, which was undergoing testing in the USSR in 1959). Although such flares didn't exist during World War II, artillery target markers were also created using signal pistol flares (there were even occasional instances of light aircraft, like the "Night Witches'" Po-2, flying behind enemy lines to fire them).
(During the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Soviet Air Force used bombers to fire artillery target markers in the mountains.)
Therefore, if Zolotarev spotted an aircraft conducting an operation upon exiting the tent, I conclude that he ordered an orderly evacuation to the safest area—northeast toward the forest—which was likely the best position for protection against a potential bombing run, given that the flare might have been fired in the direction of the Labaz (supply cache) to the south.
Krivonischenko was in the tent with the rest of the group and left his camera there (frame 34). Zolotarev photographed the light and descended the mountain  the camera. As we know, the "image degradation" here wasn't caused by water damage; this is exactly what the camera managed to capture.