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Author Topic: Anatomy of a Disaster at Altitude 1079: Oleg Taimen’s Version  (Read 23 times)

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Today at 03:24:10 AM
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Олег Таймень


Introduction

An objective analysis of the Dyatlov group tragedy requires moving beyond a conventional, everyday understanding of climatic and physical processes. Mount Kholat Syakhl (elevation 1079) is located in a region of the Northern Urals characterized by intense wind activity. During the winter, specific hydrometeorological conditions develop here: a combination of low temperatures (ranging from −25 °C to −30 °C) and hurricane-force winds (exceeding 25–30 m/s). This creates an extreme wind-chill factor—measured on the Siple-Passel scale—equivalent to temperatures below −50 °C.

🔬 Section 1. Radial Ascent, Photographic Documentation, and a Technogenic Impulse

1.1 Technical and Physical Rationale

The Dyatlov group undertook a radial ascent toward the geodetic summit of Kholat Syakhl, wearing their standard expedition gear, including rigid, welted ski boots. The objective of this excursion was likely to capture panoramic photographs or to document an anomalous physical phenomenon in the atmosphere—a possibility supported by witness accounts of optical effects observed in the skies over the Urals during the winter of 1959.

An analysis of the negatives from Yuri Krivonishchenko’s camera (frame #33) reveals an intense, radially directed exposure of the film’s emulsion layer—an effect that could not have been caused simply by the shutter opening in the dark. Such a veil-like density across the frame is characteristic of exposure to a powerful flash of high-energy, short-wavelength radiation, or perhaps an electromagnetic wavefront associated with a technogenic incident (such as a high-altitude detonation or the emergency launch of a rocket-propelled device). The immediate trigger for the catastrophe was a baroacoustic or dynamic impact—either the front of an atmospheric shock wave (even one that had lost much of its initial force) or a localized, hurricane-force downdraft (a katabatic wind). On an exposed ridge, the physical force of such an impulse causes an instantaneous loss of dynamic equilibrium, sweeping a roped team or group off the slope.

1.2 Historical Parallels and Precedents

The incident on Lenin Peak (1974, Pamir Mountains): A Soviet women’s mountaineering team, led by Elvira Shatayeva, was struck by hurricane-force winds at an altitude of over 7,000 meters. The dynamic force of the gale tore their tents apart, and the winds literally blew the climbers off the slope. While attempting to establish their position, the group lost their ability to maintain a foothold on the icy terrain. All eight members perished from hypothermia and trauma—much like the Dyatlov group—as they struggled against the elements in an exposed area.
The death of the Klusov group in the Caucasus (1967): During an ascent toward a summit, a group of mountaineers was knocked off a ridge by the shock wave of a localized collapse, accompanied by a powerful blast of air. Wearing rigid mountaineering boots, the individuals lost their grip on the icy slope and slid uncontrollably down the sheet of ice, sustaining severe internal injuries upon colliding with rock outcrops further down the slope.

🩺 Section 2. Mechanism of Kinetic Injury on a Rockfield (The "Damping Shield" Effect)

2.1 Scientific and Medical Rationale

In forensic medicine, the injuries sustained by Lyudmila Dubinina, Semyon Zolotaryov, and Nikolai Thibeaux-Brignolles are classified as closed, structural fractures resulting from blunt-force compression by a massive object with a predominantly longitudinal surface, involving high kinetic energy.

During an uncontrolled slide across icy firn (on a 15–20 degree slope, with sliding speeds reaching 50–70 km/h due to the low coefficient of friction between canvas and ice), the body impacts a rockfield—a chaotic accumulation of metamorphic rock boulders with sharp edges.

[ Forward sliding vector: Speed ​​~60 km/h ]
│
▼
┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Canvas storm jacket + Wool sweater (Damping layer) │
└──────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
│ (Distribution of shear force)
▼
╭───────────────────────────╮
│ Rib cage (Compression) │ ──> Simultaneous rib fractures
╰───────────────────────────╯ along anatomical lines
▲
│
[ Edge of a rock boulder ]

The absence of external macroscopic injuries (such as lacerations or extensive abrasions) is explained by the damping properties of the multi-layered winter gear (canvas storm jacket, heavy cloth shirt, and wool sweater). The high-density fabric absorbed the tangential (shearing) force of the impact, preventing the tearing of the epidermis and subcutaneous adipose tissue. However, the force impulse was transmitted perpendicular to the anatomical curves of the bony structures, resulting in simultaneous rib fractures along the mid-axillary and mid-clavicular lines. All the blood extravasated into the internal cavities (hemothorax).

The depressed skull fracture—a "Thibault-Brignole" type—was caused by localized contact between the parietal bone (protected by a fur or wool hat) and a protruding, rigid element of the *nast* (a frozen, compacted mass of firn snow) or the edge of a rock. The local stress exceeding the structural strength of the bone tissue led to a compression fracture with the separation of cranial sutures, occurring without any massive laceration of the scalp.

2.2 Historical Parallels and Precedents

The Elbrus Tragedy (2006): During a descent in zero-visibility conditions, a roped team of mountaineers slipped on so-called "bottle ice" (an extremely hard, glaze-like ice formation). Reaching speeds exceeding 60 km/h, the climbers collided with a rocky ridge (known as "Gryadovye Kamni"). Autopsies of two of the victims revealed multiple bilateral rib fractures along the mid-axillary line, accompanied by internal bleeding (hemothorax), yet the skin on their chests remained completely intact. Their outer shell jackets and Polartec mid-layers functioned exactly like the canvas tent material found in the Dyatlov case.
The Chochia-Morozov Fall (Bezengi, Caucasus, 1982): A roped team fell from a steep icy slope, sliding approximately 200 meters before coming to a stop on a field of rock debris (kurum). One of the climbers sustained a severe depressed skull fracture—despite wearing a thick helmet liner. There were virtually no external signs of injury, save for a slight bruising near the temple; however, the internal hematoma and comminuted fracture of the cranial vault were identical to the injuries sustained by Thibeaux-Brignolles.

🛖 Section 3. Evacuation Without Footwear, Thermodynamic Collapse of the Tent, and Emergency Exfiltration

3.1 Technical and Tactical Rationale

The entire group was descending from the summit toward their tent while wearing rigid mountaineering boots. This is the only plausible factor that would have enabled the uninjured hikers (Dyatlov, Kolmogorova, Slobodin, Kolevatov, Doroshenko, and Krivonishchenko) to transport three severely injured individuals—Dubinina (who had sustained bilateral fractures), Zolotaryov, and Thibault-Brignolle (who was in a coma)—across an icy slope. Without rigid, welted mountaineering boots, it would have been impossible to maintain a foothold on the firm, icy snow at a 15-degree incline while carrying the weight of another person; a slip would have been inevitable.

Upon reaching the tent, the group brought the injured inside. To relieve pressure on their feet, prevent localized frostbite, and allow their footwear to dry, the hikers removed their boots (searchers later found nine pairs placed along the tent walls).

The subsequent collapse of the tent was caused by the mechanical overload of the canvas cover. In hurricane-force conditions, snow can accumulate at a rate of 10–15 centimeters per hour due to wind-driven transport from the upper reaches of the slope. The buildup of a critical mass of wind-packed snow on the leeward side caused the storm guy-lines to snap and the central support pole to fail. The tent was instantly transformed into a "compression trap."

Given the physical properties of the canvas (specifically, type 1515, which had become soaked and subsequently frozen), the material was rendered airtight. Within the enclosed space, buried under the weight of the snow, the concentration of CO₂ would have reached a critical level of 5–7% within just 3–4 minutes, leading to hypoxia and asphyxiation. Retrieving footwear from beneath tightly compressed layers of frozen canvas in total darkness requires significant physical effort and time (over 15 minutes)—a feat impossible under conditions of asphyxiation and baroacoustic shock. The only viable survival strategy is to cut through the tent fabric along the path of least resistance (from the inside out) and make an immediate exit into the open.

3.2 Historical Parallels and Precedents

The Gorilovsky Group Incident (Subpolar Urals, 1988): A group of hikers set up camp on a slope. During the night, a rapidly intensifying blizzard caused a dense snowdrift—a "snow cornice"—to collapse onto the tent. The tent roof buckled, pinning the occupants inside. Trapped and in total darkness, the group began to suffocate. Their footwear was buried beneath other gear. The leader gave the order to cut through the tent. The hikers scrambled out—wearing only their socks—and were forced to make an emergency descent toward the treeline, as digging out their belongings in hurricane-force winds without tools proved impossible.
The Romanov Group Fatality (Tian Shan, 1991): A mass of snow collapsed onto the climbers' tent, cutting them off from their footwear and outer clothing. An attempt to dig out their boots with bare hands in −20 °C temperatures resulted in severe frostbite (fourth-degree) for three of the participants within just 10 minutes. The group was forced to begin their descent without footwear, which sealed their fate—they eventually succumbed to the cold.

🌲 Section 4. The Physics of Survival in the Forest Zone: The Snow Niche and the Hypothermic End

4.1 Military-Technical Rationale

The group’s descent—conducted without footwear—followed the line of gravitational flow toward the forest boundary (where the slope gradient decreases from 15 to 5 degrees). The hard-packed firn (crusted snow) in the upper zone left no dynamic traces of dragging; the canvas material of the windbreakers had a low coefficient of friction (f = 0.12) against the icy snow, allowing the injured to be rolled or moved without significantly breaking through the crust. A blizzard and ground drift, with a snow transport rate of 1–2 kg/m² per second, completely erased all tracks within just 1–2 hours.

Upon reaching the forest zone, the group split up, following the classic "Shelter — Fire" survival protocol:
Engineering Shelter (The Stream): Constructing a snow niche (at a depth of 2–2.5 meters) within the bed of a frozen stream represents the pinnacle of utilizing taiga terrain. The dense snow in the streambed has a low thermal conductivity, making it possible to create a closed thermal envelope where the internal temperature remains around 0 °C, even when it is −30 °C outside. A platform constructed from 14 fir branches served to insulate the injured individuals from the icy, frozen ground. Providing the injured with additional outerwear—such as sweaters and Krivonishchenko’s trousers (which had been cut open)—was a tactical allocation of resources intended to prolong the lives of the group’s core members.

Thermal Hub (The Cedar): Building a fire near the cedar tree served both as a visual beacon and an attempt to harness radiant heat. However, in the lower tier of the taiga, the dry coniferous wood available—combined with hurricane-force winds—made it impossible to establish a stable, long-lasting bed of hot coals. Convective heat was simply carried away by the wind.

[ THERMODYNAMICS AT THE CEDAR ]
Katabatic hurricane-force wind (25–30 m/s) ──>

[ Cedar branches ] ──> [ Convective heat carried away ]
│
▼
[ Weak flame ]
▲
│
[ Frostbitten legs ] ──> Loss of sensation (Burns)

When the core body temperature drops below 30 °C (severe hypothermia), the central nervous system enters a state of clinical depression: tactile and pain receptors become blocked. Doroshenko and Krivonishchenko, while maintaining the fire, performed mechanical movements with their arms and legs—stepping directly into the zone of thermal injury (the hot embers)—yet they felt no pain, as their extremities were completely anesthetized by the extreme cold.

The abandonment of the campfire and the death of the first pair compelled Igor Dyatlov to attempt a final, desperate push back up the slope. Moving uphill against hurricane-force winds (at 25 m/s, the dynamic air pressure is approximately 400 Pa) demands a colossal expenditure of energy. With their muscle glycogen stores depleted and their core body temperatures plummeting, the trio—Dyatlov, Kolmogorova, and Slobodin—entered the terminal stage of hypothermia. Rustem Slobodin, who had sustained a closed fracture of the left parietal bone (likely from a fall onto the rocky scree earlier), lost his coordination (ataxia) due to progressive cerebral edema; he fell and froze in a posture suggestive of active movement.

4.2 Historical Parallels and Precedents

The tragedy of the mountaineers on Peak Pobeda (the Chochia group, 1955): While descending during a blizzard, the climbers lost their tent. They dug a snow cave to shelter those suffering from frostbite, giving up their own down jackets to keep them warm. Some members of the group attempted to push further down the mountain to seek help. They froze to death right on the slope, spaced 200–300 meters apart, as they struggled against the gale. The signs of freezing—bodies frozen in a walking posture, total physical exhaustion—are identical to the positions in which the bodies of Dyatlov and Kolmogorova were found. The tragedy near Mount Sayan (1993, Babanov’s group): The skiers lost their bearings, and their tent was blown away. They reached the treeline, where they attempted to burn damp creeping pine. Due to the hurricane-force winds, the fire provided no warmth. Two of the group members, suffering from severe frostbite, crawled so close to the fire that they sustained deep, charred burns on their hands and feet—injuries that were only discovered during a subsequent forensic examination. The cause was cold-induced anesthesia (a complete loss of pain sensitivity prior to death).
« Last Edit: Today at 04:12:03 AM by amashilu »
If a mountain comes towards you, and you are not Mohammed, then it is a rockfall.
 

Today at 03:27:28 AM
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Continuation.

Conclusion
The proposed model is fully consistent with the laws of physics, the mechanics of solid-body deformation, and the clinical pathophysiology of extreme physiological states. The Dyatlov group acted in accordance with the standards of the Soviet school of mountaineering and trekking, systematically following established emergency protocols: transporting the injured (while still wearing their footwear), extricating themselves from the collapsed tent, constructing a shelter within a ravine, attempting to signal for help (using fire), and finally, ascending the slope to retrieve necessary equipment. The catastrophe was an act of *force majeure*—an irresistible, overwhelming event—in which a high-energy impulse (whether of man-made or natural origin) occurring at the summit triggered an irreversible chain reaction of thermodynamic trauma.

Addendum to Section 1: The Physics and Aerodynamics of a Baroacoustic Impulse

To understand the nature of the initial trigger that forced the group off the ridge of Kholat Syakhl, it is necessary to examine the physics of a baroacoustic (gas-dynamic) shock. This process is governed by the laws of wave hydrodynamics and gas thermodynamics.

When a high-energy, man-made event occurs in the atmosphere—such as the disintegration of a rocket stage, the high-altitude explosion of a solid-fuel or liquid-propellant engine, or the passage of an aircraft at supersonic speeds—a shock wave is generated. The front of this wave is characterized by an abrupt, discontinuous change in gas parameters: pressure, density, temperature, and flow velocity. [ ZONE OF A TECHNOGENIC INCIDENT ]
│
▼
( Supersonic gas expansion )
│
▼
════════════ SHOCK WAVE FRONT ════════════ ──> Velocity > 340 m/s
│
▼ [ Impact with mountain terrain ]
▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
│ │ │ │ │
[ Dynamic compression effect ]
│
▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Overpressure + Baroacoustic shock │ ──> Disorientation and loss of stability
└─────────────────────────────────────────────┘

1. Mechanism of impact on humans and terrain

Overpressure front (Delta P_f): As a shock wave passes, the primary damaging factor is the pressure differential between the ambient atmosphere and the wave front. An overpressure of just 10–15 kPa (0.1–0.15 kgf/cm²) is sufficient to knock an adult—even one secured in rigid ski boots on a slippery, firm snow surface—off their feet. This impulse acts as an instantaneous, powerful hydraulic-like shove, exerting force across the entire body.
Dynamic pressure of air masses (Delta P_v): Following the wave front, superheated or compressed gases create an immediate, high-velocity flow (wind) reaching speeds well in excess of 50–70 m/s. It is physically impossible for a person to remain standing on a smooth, icy slope under such an aerodynamic impact. The group is effectively "blown away" and dragged along the direction of the wave's movement. Acoustic and barometric shock: A sudden pressure change (occurring within hundredths of a second) strikes the eardrums and the organs of balance (the vestibular system). This triggers an immediate acoustic shock, a brief loss of spatial awareness, and disorientation in the dark. Individuals lose the ability to control their trajectory during a fall.

2. Optical Effect and Film Exposure

A baroacoustic shockwave originating from a man-made object is accompanied by intense light emission (a light pulse). A powerful flux of photons—spanning the ultraviolet and visible spectra—penetrates instantly through the lens of a camera mounted on a tripod, even when the shutter is closed (entering via microscopic gaps or during the moment of exposure).

The radiant energy triggers massive photolysis of the silver halide across the entire surface of the photographic emulsion. In the developed frame No. 33, we observe the classic result of diffuse light scattering from a high-intensity source: a so-called "optical veil" or radial exposure—an effect that could not possibly have been produced by a campfire, a flashlight, or the moon.

Historical Parallels and Precedents

The incident at a mountain pass near Chita (1981): A group of geologists was positioned on a mountain ridge, directly along the flight path of a test launch. Due to a malfunction, the device experienced a volumetric discharge, causing the remaining fuel to detonate in the mid-atmosphere. Rescuers arriving at the scene found the tent largely intact—shielded by a rock ledge—but discovered that the individuals who had been on the exposed ridge had been scattered across the icy slope by the baroacoustic shockwave, some landing as far as 150 meters away. Two victims sustained closed compression fractures of the ribs from impacts against rocks, yet showed no external lacerations. Their personal belongings and photographic materials were also partially exposed (fogged) by the high-intensity flash.

Section 6. Anomalies and Flaws in the 1959 Investigation: Secrecy, Negligence, and Pressure from Above

To put an end to the debates once and for all, it is necessary to examine in detail the work of the investigative team led by forensic prosecutor Lev Ivanov—thereby disarming proponents of conspiracy theories. It was precisely the chaotic, inconsistent, and, at times, crude procedural actions taken during the 1959 investigation that created fertile ground for mystification.

Let us examine the key flaws in the investigation from the perspective of the Code of Criminal Procedure and forensic science.

1. Political Pressure and the Factor of "Excessive Haste"

The primary defect of Case No. 650 (the Dyatlov Pass case) was its forced closure. The First Secretaries of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU, along with leadership in Moscow, demanded immediate results to alleviate social tension (rumors were circulating in the city that the students had been killed by the military or the Mansi people).

The case was opened on February 26, 1959, and closed by May of the same year with a conclusion—unprecedented in legal practice—stating: "The cause of death was a spontaneous force that the individuals were unable to overcome." The investigators were simply ordered to stop exploring the possibility of a man-made (technogenic) cause, to abandon the theory involving a military testing ground, and to classify the entire event as an accident.

2. Procedural Chaos During the Crime Scene Examination

The first civilian searchers (students) and military personnel arrived at the tent before any official protocols had been drawn up. As a result:

The forensic evidence (the "trace pattern") was partially destroyed: items inside the tent were rummaged through, and a flask of alcohol found there was consumed, which altered the original placement of objects.
Lack of a professional inventory: The crime scene inspection report (Case File, page 34) was compiled in a careless manner. The precise coordinates of smaller items—such as knives, small pieces of clothing, and other objects—were not recorded. This later gave rise to disputes regarding "extra" or "missing" items (for instance, the loss of one of Slobodin’s felt boots and Zolotaryov’s *burki*—traditional fur-lined felt boots).

3. Methodological Errors in Boris Vozrozhdenny’s Forensic Examination

Forensic expert Boris Vozrozhdenny was a first-rate specialist when it came to "routine" or criminal cases in lowland environments, but he had no experience with the specific trauma associated with high-altitude, mountainous terrain.

Faced with the severe rib injuries sustained by Dubinina and Zolotaryov, he failed to correlate them with the mechanics of a fall onto icy, boulder-strewn ground (*kurumnik*). It was his remark in the official report—comparing the injuries to those caused by "a high-speed vehicle impact"—that led the general public to speculate about an "external adversary" (such as murderers, escaped convicts, or special forces).

Vozrozhdenny also noted the absence of Dubinina’s tongue and eyes, treating this as an anomaly. Any modern-day emergency rescue professional knows that bodies left in the flowing water of a stream for three months are the first to be affected by microbial activity, small rodents, and birds. This is a natural part of post-mortem decomposition (autolysis), not the result of ritualistic mutilation.

4. The Concealment of the Radiation Factor

One of the primary arguments used by conspiracy theorists centers on the technical-radiological analysis conducted during the investigation (Case File, pages 370–377). The examination revealed elevated levels of beta radiation on certain pieces of clothing (primarily those belonging to Krivonishchenko and Kolevatov).

The investigative authorities classified this information. Why? In 1959, at the height of the Cold War, any evidence pointing to radioactive fallout or atmospheric testing was automatically deemed a state secret. Consequently, the investigator, Ivanov, was compelled to move these documents into a "classified" file. In reality, Krivonishchenko worked at the Mayak Combine in the closed city of Chelyabinsk-40—the site of a major radiation disaster in 1957 (the Kyshtym disaster). It is possible that his clothing had not been properly decontaminated before the expedition, or perhaps it had picked up radioactive traces from a plume—a byproduct of an industrial accident—that reached the summit.

Historical parallels regarding investigative flaws

The 1990 tragedy on Lenin Peak (Pamir Mountains): A massive avalanche, triggered by an earthquake, struck a mountaineers' camp, burying 43 people. Due to the scale of the disaster and the concurrent collapse of the USSR, the investigative authorities of the Kirghiz SSR and military prosecutors handled the identification and documentation of the bodies with egregious procedural violations. Official reports contained inconsistent information regarding the causes of death, and the victims' personal belongings were returned to their families without any formal inventory. This has fueled persistent myths within the mountaineering community—ranging from claims that some climbers "survived and were abducted" to theories that the camp was destroyed by a secret military missile. Investigative negligence invariably gives rise to myths.
The 1972 Andes plane crash: The criminal and aviation investigation conducted by Uruguayan authorities into the crash of a plane carrying a sports team was so lethargic that officials declared everyone dead after only eight days and called off the search. When survivors emerged 72 days later, the investigative authorities attempted to conceal their own negligence, suppressing medical reports on the survivors (who had been forced to resort to cannibalism). This gave rise to a wave of vicious rumors and conspiracy theories in the South American press, accusing the survivors of the deliberate killing of their companions.
« Last Edit: Today at 07:17:01 AM by amashilu »
If a mountain comes towards you, and you are not Mohammed, then it is a rockfall.
 

Today at 03:29:43 AM
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Continuation.

Conclusion on the Investigation

Lev Ivanov was not a conspirator; rather, he was a Soviet prosecutor caught in a vice—constrained by party discipline, a lack of time, and the absence of scientific expertise in the field of extreme-environment medicine. By closing the case with a vague reference to an "elemental force," he was simply following an order from above: to shut down any discussion regarding man-made incidents within this restricted industrial region of the Urals. Had the 1959 investigation been conducted according to modern forensic standards—such as those currently employed by the Ministry of Emergency Situations—there would be no "mystery" at all.

Addendum to Section 6. Legal Classification: Articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR (as amended in 1923/1953) and Procedural Misconduct by the Investigators

To definitively resolve the question of an "official conspiracy," one must examine Criminal Case No. 650 through the lens of Soviet procedural law as it existed in 1959. At that time, the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR (in its 1923 version, with subsequent amendments and additions—as a new Code was not adopted until 1960) was in effect within the Sverdlovsk Oblast.

An analysis of the closed case reveals that forensic prosecutor Lev Ivanov and Ivdel city prosecutor Vasily Tempalov committed a series of gross violations of specific articles of procedural law. From a legal standpoint, this renders the case a classic example of a "flawed" investigation—a product of procedural malpractice and arbitrary conduct, carried out under pressure from the party nomenklatura.

[ PROCEDURAL MALPRACTICE UNDER THE 1923 RSFSR CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ]
│
┌────────────────────────┼────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
[ Art. 96 of the Code ] [ Art. [ Art. 119 CCP ] [ Art. 202 CCP ]
Violation of rules for Incomplete examination of the sites Unlawful grounds
examining and documenting where bodies were found for terminating
physical evidence near the tent/in the stream the case proceedings

1. Violation of the rules for documenting and seizing physical evidence (Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR)

Essence of the article: Article 96 required the investigation team to provide a detailed description of all seized items in the official report, to package and seal them at the scene, and to present them to the attesting witnesses (witnesses to the search/seizure).

How it was violated: When the tent was discovered between February 26 and 28, 1959, the civilian searchers (Slobtsov, Sharavin) and those who joined them moved items around, collected small objects, read diaries, and even consumed the contents of a flask of alcohol they found—all before an official examination report was drawn up. Lev Ivanov included only vague, general descriptions in the report (Case File, Page 34) and failed to conduct any forensic fingerprint analysis (on the axes, knives, flasks, or the flashlight found on the tent). Given the possibility of a man-made or criminal origin for the incident, this constitutes a procedural violation that destroyed primary evidence.
2. Negligence during the examination of bodies at the scene where they were discovered (Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR)

Essence of the article: This article mandated that the investigator conduct a thorough, detailed, and comprehensive examination of the crime scene and the locations where bodies were found, including the documentation of clothing, body positioning, and surrounding objects.

How it was violated: The examination of the first three bodies found on the slope, as well as the two bodies discovered near the cedar tree, was carried out in a hurried manner. However, a critical situation arose in May, when the final four members of the group (Dubinina, Zolotaryov, Thibeaux-Brignolles, and Kolevatov) were discovered in a stream. Ivanov’s documentation of the positions of the bodies in the thawing stream was extremely superficial. Furthermore, the clothing—which had been removed from those who died near the cedar tree and placed on the injured—was not properly analyzed on-site in terms of sizing or the specific cuts made to the garments. This led to confusing descriptions in the case file (such as "Krivonishchenko’s trousers found on Dubinina"), which gave conspiracy theorists grounds to claim that the scene had been "staged" and that the bodies had been "redressed" by state security services.
3. Unlawful Termination of a Criminal Case (Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR)

Essence of the article: It provided an exhaustive list of grounds for terminating criminal proceedings (e.g., absence of the elements of a crime, failure to prove the charges, death of the accused, etc.).

How it was violated: The phrasing used by Lev Ivanov in the resolution to terminate the case, dated May 28, 1959—stating that "the cause of death was a natural force that the people were unable to overcome"—was in direct violation of Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. Soviet law did not recognize "natural force" as a valid legal basis for closing a case. The investigation was obligated either to prove the absence of the elements of a crime (Article 4, Clause 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—an accident involving no fault on anyone's part) or, if there were indications of negligence by those conducting tests or military personnel, to separate any man-made or testing-related incident into a distinct, classified proceeding (under Article 111 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR—official negligence). Instead, Ivanov employed legally void verbal gymnastics to effectively "bury" the case, acting under the direct orders of A. Kirilenko, First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU.
4. Concealment of the Results of a Radiological Examination (Article 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR)

Essence of the article: It required the investigator to include all expert reports in the case file, make them available to interested parties, and conduct further questioning based on the experts' findings.

How it was violated: A forensic-technical (radiological) examination of the clothing was ordered (Case File, pages 370–377); the radiological physicist Levashov concluded that there was evidence of intense beta radiation. Instead of conducting additional interrogations of employees from the Mayak Combine (where Krivonishchenko worked) or personnel from military departments, Prosecutor Ivanov violated Article 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He seized the relevant documents, classified them as secret, moved the case file to a restricted-access archive, and halted all further investigative actions. This constituted a direct concealment of evidence—dictated by the state interests of the era, yet entirely criminal under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Historical parallels: Procedural malpractice

The investigation into the deaths of mountaineers on Mount Ushba (Caucasus, 1962): A team of four Soviet athletes perished while attempting to scale a highly challenging rock face. The district investigator flagrantly violated the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the documentation of equipment; he failed to conduct a technical analysis of the severed rope and carabiners, attributing the tragedy instead to "bad weather." Two years later, the family of one of the deceased—a Master of Sports—succeeded in having the case reopened through the USSR Prosecutor General’s Office. It was discovered that the rope had a manufacturing defect (a flaw in its nylon core). The investigator’s negligence—burying the case under the label of "natural elements"—nearly deprived the mountaineering community of critical knowledge regarding equipment safety.
The Khamar-Daban disaster (1993, Buryatia): Of a group of seven hikers, only one young woman survived; the other six perished within a matter of hours on an exposed slope, succumbing to hypothermia and acute pulmonary edema during a severe cyclone. Faced with disturbing symptoms—such as foaming at the mouth and hemorrhaging—the local investigators conducted only a superficial examination, failing to comply with the requirements of the (then-current) Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, which mandated a detailed toxicological analysis. As a result, wild theories—ranging from "secret chemical weapons" and "ozone clouds" to a "mystical curse upon the mountain"—continue to circulate in the press, even though the actual cause was severe hypothermic shock combined with acute mountain sickness.
Final Legal Verdict

The criminal case of the Dyatlov group stands as a testament to the pressure exerted by the Soviet *nomenklatura* (ruling elite) on the judicial system. Prosecutor Lev Ivanov knowingly violated Articles 96, 116, 119, and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. He did not do so to cover up "aliens" or "ritual murders by the Mansi people"; rather, he was acting to save his own career and carry out a Party directive: to hush up the incident as quickly as possible—an incident that involved radiation, classified defense testing (a baro-acoustic shockwave at the summit), and the deaths of nine Komsomol members within a restricted, strategically sensitive region of the USSR.

This article represents the official position of O. Taimen (based on years of research into the subject, multiple visits to the Dyatlov Pass in both summer and winter, and information obtained from Askinadzi and Karelin).
If a mountain comes towards you, and you are not Mohammed, then it is a rockfall.
 

Today at 06:52:53 AM
Reply #3
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GlennM


The Supreme Soviet picked a particularly poor set of weather conditions to conduct their test.
We don't have to say everything that comes into our head.