Sharavin interview in 2013

[sarapuk]

Well firing at unknown objects means you may be firing at your own people. Where does it state that they were sweeping the hills from day 1  !  ?

When the most famous shotdown in the USSR happened - shooting down the USAF U-2 in 1960 near Sverdlovsk!!!, 14 SAM were fired, one hit U-2 plane, one was a friendly fire hit of the soviet interceptor aircraft and the remaining dozen crashed god knows where. It was not the the first breach of the Soviet airspace by USAF and thus not the first 14 SAMs fired. The order of battle at that time was basically to bring down USAF aircraft by all means including ramming by other aircraft. BTW remember the KAL007? Soviet military has a bad history of firing at own people or civilians so ask them why they fired SAMs at unknown objects.

Probably the generals/air marshals were under strict standing orders to fire at all perceived threats. Any less would be treason.

Perceived Threats  !  ?  Dosnt mean that there was or is a Policy off shooting off Missiles at unknown flying objects.

[gypsy]

You say that information sharing was virtually non existent between higher and lower ranks when it came to the military  !  ?  Good job you are wrong.  The USSR had Nuclear capability from the time of Stalin. There had to be communication at all levels. Same for the other Nuclear capable Nations, and still is.

Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. Sharing information pretty much defeats the purpose of making something secret. All military or intelligence information was classified in the USSR and unauthorized sharing was punishable (art.75 of Criminal of the RSFSR, version 1960). That is exactly why local "authorities" such as investigators or prosecutors were never aware of any Military or KGB activity. Do you think that if there is a new weapon test (maybe an illegal one, chemical? spiked with uranium?), the Air force officers along with KGB men would first travel around Soviet Russia to brief all the low-ranked comrades? Sounds silly, doesn't it?

"Pre-digital technology helped, including Soviet policies that
monopolized the early digital technologies and kept them well away from
anyone who was not completely reliable. But technology was not
everything. The hermetic, suffocating character of Soviet secrecy can
hardly be explained without mentioning another constituent that was not
so much institutional as moral or ethical. Soviet leaders were entirely
unaffected by any sense of obligation to account in public for the
decisions they made or their outcomes. On the contrary, the greatest
obligation that they felt was to each other, expressed in a code of silence
that they called “conspirativeness.”
The concept of conspirativeness was unknown to Hutchings (1987),
and it was a surprise to Fitzpatrick (1990). But the code was as old as the
Bolshevik Revolution. It had its origins in the pre-revolutionary
underground. When the Bolsheviks came to power, conspirativeness
became an organizing principle of the new Soviet state, being formalized
in the 1920s, at the beginning of Stalin’s tenure as party general secretary
4
(Kurenkov 2015; also Istochnik 1993; Khlevniuk et al. 1995: 74-77; on
“conspirativity” in the Romanian Securitate, see Verdery 2014: 43-50).
Under conspirativeness, no one had a right to know anything at all.
There was only need-to-know, granted by higher to lower authority and
only ever on a discretionary and temporary basis. Table 1 contrasts the
basic codes of Soviet and American government secrecy since World War
II. As the table suggests, right-to-know versus need-to-know was a
defining conflict of the Cold War (cf Hutchings 1987: 224-226). " p.3-4

"The capacity of the Soviet state to prevent abuse of office was limited
by the fact that the most important stage of initial investigation was itself
secret. This was the stage of party investigation, which provided the first
filter in the processing of cases of wrong doing. Party investigation was a
party secret, not a state secret, but the concept of conspirativeness that
applied was identical. " p.14

source: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2017/twerp_1134_harrison.pdf

Ok so you claim that there was very little information sharing between the higher and lower ranks of the Soviet Military. And I claim that there was plenty of information sharing. You present a paper that someone at a University has put together to prove what  !  ?  Do you really believe that there was no information sharing between all ranks of the Soviet Military during the so called Cold War, when both the USSR and the USA where just a BUTTON PRESS away from annihilating one another !  ?  There does not need to be SECRETS between the various Military Branches. Its very important that they each know what the other is doing etc etc. You keep SECRETS from the ENEMY. And the ENEMY was the USA and unfortunately, STILL IS.

And you are saying that based on what exactly? Or just stating the opposite for no apparent reason? There are laws concerning the classified information even now. The current Russian legislation is not so different when it comes to intelligence and military matters. Please read it first and you are very welcome to discuss. Otherwise we are not getting anywhere with this conversation.

[sarapuk]

Well firing at unknown objects means you may be firing at your own people. Where does it state that they were sweeping the hills from day 1  !  ?

When the most famous shotdown in the USSR happened - shooting down the USAF U-2 in 1960 near Sverdlovsk!!!, 14 SAM were fired, one hit U-2 plane, one was a friendly fire hit of the soviet interceptor aircraft and the remaining dozen crashed god knows where. It was not the the first breach of the Soviet airspace by USAF and thus not the first 14 SAMs fired. The order of battle at that time was basically to bring down USAF aircraft by all means including ramming by other aircraft. BTW remember the KAL007? Soviet military has a bad history of firing at own people or civilians so ask them why they fired SAMs at unknown objects.

Probably the generals/air marshals were under strict standing orders to fire at all perceived threats. Any less would be treason.

Yes, that was pretty much the case. The pilot of Russian fighter jet was instructed to ram the U2 if necessary. There is a Russian source to it: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/6393

(understandable with Google translate for non Russian speakers)

Bit of a difference between firing off Missiles at unknown flying objects and asking a Warplane to ram another Warplane if need be  !  ?

[sarapuk]

Well firing at unknown objects means you may be firing at your own people. Where does it state that they were sweeping the hills from day 1  !  ?

When the most famous shotdown in the USSR happened - shooting down the USAF U-2 in 1960 near Sverdlovsk!!!, 14 SAM were fired, one hit U-2 plane, one was a friendly fire hit of the soviet interceptor aircraft and the remaining dozen crashed god knows where. It was not the the first breach of the Soviet airspace by USAF and thus not the first 14 SAMs fired. The order of battle at that time was basically to bring down USAF aircraft by all means including ramming by other aircraft. BTW remember the KAL007? Soviet military has a bad history of firing at own people or civilians so ask them why they fired SAMs at unknown objects.

Probably the generals/air marshals were under strict standing orders to fire at all perceived threats. Any less would be treason.

Yes, that was pretty much the case. The pilot of Russian fighter jet was instructed to ram the U2 if necessary. There is a Russian source to it: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/6393

(understandable with Google translate for non Russian speakers)

Thanks for the article, ordering a pilot without even high altitude equipment to try and ram the plane with a one shot attempt above it's operating ceiling indicates the mindset. Doesn't sound like they had great faith in the SA-75s! 

Sounds like such an order was the CORRECT ONE to Me.  Even today Missiles are not guaranteed to hit their target.

[sarapuk]

I find it very hard to believe that the Soviets would fire off SAM'S at unknown objects over a fairly remote area  !  ?

I don't think it was strategically that remote. The Urals are significant to the mindset. It's my understanding that during WW2 one of Germany's key mistakes was not to develop a long range bomber that could attack Russia's industrial heartland east of the Urals (from forward airfields west of Moscow and in the Ukraine). So Russia's industrial war effort was unhindered in what became a mammoth war of attrition. It was a key mistake that on it's own could be said to have cost them the war in the East. After WW2 afaik Russia's industrial military machine continued to be based in this region. So any ingress into the airspace near Sverdlovsk had massive strategic implications with the Ural mountains being iconic. Get the Sverdlovsk region and you've got Russia perhaps. Also a full scale airborne attack by a substantially stronger country would perhaps choose a remote area in winter in order to build up forces as the region would not allow the defending country an easy response.

Strategically Remote ! ?  Well there are vast areas of Russia that are still fairly remote, strategically or not. You mention MINDSET. The Russian Military were and still are very well trained in such MINDSET matters. Obviously mistakes happen. Plenty of mistakes happened during the Gulf War.

[gypsy]

Well firing at unknown objects means you may be firing at your own people. Where does it state that they were sweeping the hills from day 1  !  ?

When the most famous shotdown in the USSR happened - shooting down the USAF U-2 in 1960 near Sverdlovsk!!!, 14 SAM were fired, one hit U-2 plane, one was a friendly fire hit of the soviet interceptor aircraft and the remaining dozen crashed god knows where. It was not the the first breach of the Soviet airspace by USAF and thus not the first 14 SAMs fired. The order of battle at that time was basically to bring down USAF aircraft by all means including ramming by other aircraft. BTW remember the KAL007? Soviet military has a bad history of firing at own people or civilians so ask them why they fired SAMs at unknown objects.

Probably the generals/air marshals were under strict standing orders to fire at all perceived threats. Any less would be treason.

Yes, that was pretty much the case. The pilot of Russian fighter jet was instructed to ram the U2 if necessary. There is a Russian source to it: https://vpk-news.ru/articles/6393

(understandable with Google translate for non Russian speakers)

Bit of a difference between firing off Missiles at unknown flying objects and asking a Warplane to ram another Warplane if need be  !  ?

Ramming an enemy aircraft in necessary AND firing 14 SAMs on the target (12 missed) Is it that impossible that one of them would make some collateral damage on the ground somewhere? I guess those remaining missiles did not just turn into dust.

[sarapuk]

Well that is probably why they fired more than one SAM...  little overkill never killed nobody in Soviet union...

But going back to the topic, I would be interested what people working at the radar and air defence station have to say about the Ivanov's fire orbs or any unusual activity caught on radar around the date of the DPI. I have no idea if some sort of natural electrical phenomenon would be visible on radar used by Soviet Air defence in 1959. We know the SA75s were operational since 1957 and at least some of them in 1960 were fired upon spy planes with no hit... Also I would be interested in the procedure of recovery of such wreckages (exclusion zone? army deployment to a remote area by helicopter? ) According to the article, the friendly fire incident was kept secret for many years. Guess what would happen if that was a civilian hit...

I like it, it's a good theory, what to do with the spent rockets that don't hit their target. If they have control surfaces that can be guided from the ground then could they not be remotely piloted in a glide to a safe crash zone? A glide path could possibly greatly exceed their range. Maybe in the Urals with a name like Dead Mountain?... Then send in some helicopters as garbage trucks. You'd need a tracked vehicle to drag the stuff to the pickup location. An Mil Mi-6 with a payload of 12 tonnes would do nicely. Then you find a tent with signs of nine people, oops. Three weeks later, you're notified of a rescue mission for overdue tourists. Better send along a team with metal detectors just in case the cleanup operation missed anything. It will be easy for them to stay ahead of the main search group probing the ground. Put a senior staff officer in charge of the sappers as he has to know what he's looking for.

It's a good fit!

Good Fit  !  ?  It doesnt fit much of what actually happened to the Dyatlov Group.  As many of us have discussed in other parts of this Forum.

[gypsy]

Well firing at unknown objects means you may be firing at your own people. Where does it state that they were sweeping the hills from day 1  !  ?

When the most famous shotdown in the USSR happened - shooting down the USAF U-2 in 1960 near Sverdlovsk!!!, 14 SAM were fired, one hit U-2 plane, one was a friendly fire hit of the soviet interceptor aircraft and the remaining dozen crashed god knows where. It was not the the first breach of the Soviet airspace by USAF and thus not the first 14 SAMs fired. The order of battle at that time was basically to bring down USAF aircraft by all means including ramming by other aircraft. BTW remember the KAL007? Soviet military has a bad history of firing at own people or civilians so ask them why they fired SAMs at unknown objects.

Probably the generals/air marshals were under strict standing orders to fire at all perceived threats. Any less would be treason.

Perceived Threats  !  ?  Dosnt mean that there was or is a Policy off shooting off Missiles at unknown flying objects.

Rules of engagement allow for firing missiles onto unknown/not responding/hostile objects in the airspace. It is up to the commander to decide on that. In the times between 1958 and 1960 when the US were flying numerous sorties wit U2 spyplanes, the order to shoot down the "object" is an obvious choice. So yes, we can say that was the policy at that time.

[Nigel Evans]

Well that is probably why they fired more than one SAM...  little overkill never killed nobody in Soviet union...

But going back to the topic, I would be interested what people working at the radar and air defence station have to say about the Ivanov's fire orbs or any unusual activity caught on radar around the date of the DPI. I have no idea if some sort of natural electrical phenomenon would be visible on radar used by Soviet Air defence in 1959. We know the SA75s were operational since 1957 and at least some of them in 1960 were fired upon spy planes with no hit... Also I would be interested in the procedure of recovery of such wreckages (exclusion zone? army deployment to a remote area by helicopter? ) According to the article, the friendly fire incident was kept secret for many years. Guess what would happen if that was a civilian hit...

I like it, it's a good theory, what to do with the spent rockets that don't hit their target. If they have control surfaces that can be guided from the ground then could they not be remotely piloted in a glide to a safe crash zone? A glide path could possibly greatly exceed their range. Maybe in the Urals with a name like Dead Mountain?... Then send in some helicopters as garbage trucks. You'd need a tracked vehicle to drag the stuff to the pickup location. An Mil Mi-6 with a payload of 12 tonnes would do nicely. Then you find a tent with signs of nine people, oops. Three weeks later, you're notified of a rescue mission for overdue tourists. Better send along a team with metal detectors just in case the cleanup operation missed anything. It will be easy for them to stay ahead of the main search group probing the ground. Put a senior staff officer in charge of the sappers as he has to know what he's looking for.

It's a good fit!

Good Fit  !  ?  It doesnt fit much of what actually happened to the Dyatlov Group.  As many of us have discussed in other parts of this Forum.

Works for me, what aspects are you unhappy about?

[sarapuk]

The U2 had a 'jammer' that jammed the communications between radar, launch site, and missile.  The Russians were "spraying and praying".   

Sounds like more of a reason why a missile could hit something on the ground by mistake.

Yup, and interception via another aircraft was..... futile.   These things technically go into OUTERSPACE!

Take a ride in a U2 which is STILL currently in operation!   

PLEASE GO TO THE 7:45 MARK AND FULL SCREEN.




GO TO 3:30

The Soviets were aware of the reconnaissance flights, because they could spot the spy planes on radar. For nearly four years, however, the U.S.S.R. was powerless to stop them. Flying at an altitude of more than 13 miles above the ground, the U-2 aircraft were initially unreachable by both Soviet jets and missiles. However, by the spring of 1960, the USSR had developed a new Zenith surface-to-air missile with a longer range. On May 1, that weapon locked onto a U-2 flown by 30-year-old CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers.As Powers flew over Sverdlovsk (present-day Yekaterinburg, Russia), a Soviet surface-to-air missile exploded near his plane, causing it to drop to a lower altitude. A second missile scored a direct hit, and Powers and his aircraft began to plummet from the sky. The pilot managed to bail out, but when his parachute floated to earth, he was surrounded by Soviet forces. Powers landed in the center of a major diplomatic crisis.

It wasnt a very fast plane but then again it didnt really need to be because it was designed to fly HIGH.

[Loose}{Cannon]